Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation
(Berghahn Books, David L. Phillips)
The Turkish-Armenian conflict has lasted for nearly a century and still continues in attenuated forms to poison the relationship between these two peoples. The author, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations and previously advisor to the United Nations, undertook, as head of the Turkish- Armenian Reconciliation Committee, to bring the two sides together and to work with them towards a peaceful resolution of the enmity that had made any contact between them taboo. His lively account of the difficult negotiations makes fascinating reading; it shows that the newly developed “track-two diplomacy” is an effective tool for reconciling even intractable foes through fostering dialog, contact and cooperation.
Sunday, February 28, 2010
THE BLOOD FEUD GOES ON
THE BLOOD FEUD GOES ON
Turkish News
www.turkishnews.com.tr
December 14, 2001
Had the eminent members of TARC displayed more maturity, wisdom
and courage things might have been different. But this was clearly not
to be Looking at some of the reports emanating from Armenia and the
Armenian community in America and Europe over the past two days...
----------
SEMÝH ÝDÝZ
----------
... it is clear that the hardliners are gloating over the failure of
the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC). They never
liked this venture anyway and made it very apparent from the
start. For example the Armenian members of TARC came under fire on day
one by the rightwing and ultranationalist Armenian Dashnak Party,
otherwise known as the Revolutionary Federation of Armenia.
Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian for his part went so far
as to call on the Armenian members to withdraw from the Commission,
openly implying that its continuation was doing harm to the `Armenian
cause.' For the Armenian side TARC was nothing short of `a ploy'
by Turks to divert attention from the disputed Armenian genocide.
It is an objective fact that the Turkish side was far more
level-headed and calmer on this score. There were hardly any vocal
critics of this venture. While the Turkish foreign ministry disowned the
initiative, there can be no doubt that it was following its proceedings
from the corner of its eyes to see where matters would lead.
But neither can it be doubted, given the way things were
developing, that it would not be long before angry voices were raised
against this venture on the Turkish side also. If we just look at the
controversy that raged in Turkey only a few days ago over the Turkish
film `Salkým Haným's Diamonds' we see that many in Turkey have
a long way to go yet before they can look at the past objectively,
maturely and with a sense of human compassion in order to try and
understand what really happened in 1915.
With both sides sticking religiously to their own political
interpretation of these sad events of the past it seems that
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation will have to wait for another time
that is characterized by much more wisdom than we have today. I used
the term `political interpretation' above intentionally because much
of what is said on both sides has little to do with history but a lot
to do with ethnically motivated folkloric memories and an ongoing game
of oneupmanship between the two nations with a view to securing
political, and subsequently legal advantages.
This is in fact what scuttled TARC. Both sides started off by
declaring that seeing as it was clear neither side could sway the other
on the issue of 1915, both sides should work for better understanding
between the two nations regardless of this fact. But it did not take
long for the boat to flounder, mainly because the Armenian members were
put under a cloud of suspicion with charges of betraying the Armenian
cause. There is a belief on the Armenian side that a 30 year campaign --
involving shameless terrorism that left scores of Turkish diplomats dead
-- which aims to have the Armenian genocide recognized is gaining major
ground.
It may be gaining ground in some respects, but there is little
that has changed as far as the Turkish side is concerned. With every
supposed political gain the Armenian side secures the Turkish position
becomes even more hardline. If Armenians believe that Turks can be
browbeaten into accepting their exclusive interpretation of history
because some self-serving Western politicians are backing them, then
they are seriously deluding themselves.
It is of course the prerogative of the Armenians to believe a
systematic genocide was perpetrated against their grandparents by
Ottoman Turks. It is a fact, after all, that hundreds of thousands of
Armenians died in horrible conditions -- along side the millions of
other Anatolians that died in a similar fashion -- during World War One.
By virtue of the same argument however it is also the prerogative
of Turks to reject this interpretation of events. On the other hand,
`legislating history,' as the French Parliament tried to do last
year with its `law' recognizing the alleged Armenian genocide will
change nothing in the end.
Armenians like to reel off the names of historians and
intellectuals who support the genocide thesis. On the other hand they
reject the fact that eminent non-Turkish academics, such as Bernard
Lewis and Justin McCarthy, have tried to put the events of 1915 in
proper perspective, and have forcefully disputed many Armenian claims. I
am not aware however that these men have been declared `bogus
academics' by the independent academic community in the United States
or in the world. To the contrary the stature of Bernard Lewis is growing
by the day given his deep knowledge of the Islamic world in general, and
Turkey in particular. Only a few days ago U.S.News & World Report
carried an extensive portrait on him under the headline `A Sage for
the Age.'
The short of it is that whatever personal assumptions and
prejudices there may be on both sides, the historic verdict is yet to be
given on the events of 1915 for those who are clamoring for a true
understanding of the causal events that led to the overlapping tragedies
of those turbulent years. The matter simply has not been studied
sufficiently by independent sources who bear no allegiance -- emotional
or otherwise -- to either side. Much of what has been written is either
by Turkish or Armenian historians or researchers -- who can hardly be
impartial in a matter like this -- or their sympathizers. The names that
come to mind immediately here are Arnold Toynbee, Israel Charny, Taner
Akçam, Christopher J. Walker, Esat Uras, and Sadi Koçaþ -- to list
but just a few.
But then the Turkish-Armenian dispute today has little to do
with history. It is a typical oriental tale of seeking vengeance,
vindication and retribution. Neither side has attained the social
maturity that would enable them to look together at a bloody past with
a view to drawing the true lessons about man's inhumanity to man. Put
bluntly the blood feud mentality goes on with no sight in end. Had the
eminent members of TARC displayed more maturity, wisdom and courage
things might have been different. But this was clearly not to be.
Turkish News
www.turkishnews.com.tr
December 14, 2001
Had the eminent members of TARC displayed more maturity, wisdom
and courage things might have been different. But this was clearly not
to be Looking at some of the reports emanating from Armenia and the
Armenian community in America and Europe over the past two days...
----------
SEMÝH ÝDÝZ
----------
... it is clear that the hardliners are gloating over the failure of
the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC). They never
liked this venture anyway and made it very apparent from the
start. For example the Armenian members of TARC came under fire on day
one by the rightwing and ultranationalist Armenian Dashnak Party,
otherwise known as the Revolutionary Federation of Armenia.
Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian for his part went so far
as to call on the Armenian members to withdraw from the Commission,
openly implying that its continuation was doing harm to the `Armenian
cause.' For the Armenian side TARC was nothing short of `a ploy'
by Turks to divert attention from the disputed Armenian genocide.
It is an objective fact that the Turkish side was far more
level-headed and calmer on this score. There were hardly any vocal
critics of this venture. While the Turkish foreign ministry disowned the
initiative, there can be no doubt that it was following its proceedings
from the corner of its eyes to see where matters would lead.
But neither can it be doubted, given the way things were
developing, that it would not be long before angry voices were raised
against this venture on the Turkish side also. If we just look at the
controversy that raged in Turkey only a few days ago over the Turkish
film `Salkým Haným's Diamonds' we see that many in Turkey have
a long way to go yet before they can look at the past objectively,
maturely and with a sense of human compassion in order to try and
understand what really happened in 1915.
With both sides sticking religiously to their own political
interpretation of these sad events of the past it seems that
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation will have to wait for another time
that is characterized by much more wisdom than we have today. I used
the term `political interpretation' above intentionally because much
of what is said on both sides has little to do with history but a lot
to do with ethnically motivated folkloric memories and an ongoing game
of oneupmanship between the two nations with a view to securing
political, and subsequently legal advantages.
This is in fact what scuttled TARC. Both sides started off by
declaring that seeing as it was clear neither side could sway the other
on the issue of 1915, both sides should work for better understanding
between the two nations regardless of this fact. But it did not take
long for the boat to flounder, mainly because the Armenian members were
put under a cloud of suspicion with charges of betraying the Armenian
cause. There is a belief on the Armenian side that a 30 year campaign --
involving shameless terrorism that left scores of Turkish diplomats dead
-- which aims to have the Armenian genocide recognized is gaining major
ground.
It may be gaining ground in some respects, but there is little
that has changed as far as the Turkish side is concerned. With every
supposed political gain the Armenian side secures the Turkish position
becomes even more hardline. If Armenians believe that Turks can be
browbeaten into accepting their exclusive interpretation of history
because some self-serving Western politicians are backing them, then
they are seriously deluding themselves.
It is of course the prerogative of the Armenians to believe a
systematic genocide was perpetrated against their grandparents by
Ottoman Turks. It is a fact, after all, that hundreds of thousands of
Armenians died in horrible conditions -- along side the millions of
other Anatolians that died in a similar fashion -- during World War One.
By virtue of the same argument however it is also the prerogative
of Turks to reject this interpretation of events. On the other hand,
`legislating history,' as the French Parliament tried to do last
year with its `law' recognizing the alleged Armenian genocide will
change nothing in the end.
Armenians like to reel off the names of historians and
intellectuals who support the genocide thesis. On the other hand they
reject the fact that eminent non-Turkish academics, such as Bernard
Lewis and Justin McCarthy, have tried to put the events of 1915 in
proper perspective, and have forcefully disputed many Armenian claims. I
am not aware however that these men have been declared `bogus
academics' by the independent academic community in the United States
or in the world. To the contrary the stature of Bernard Lewis is growing
by the day given his deep knowledge of the Islamic world in general, and
Turkey in particular. Only a few days ago U.S.News & World Report
carried an extensive portrait on him under the headline `A Sage for
the Age.'
The short of it is that whatever personal assumptions and
prejudices there may be on both sides, the historic verdict is yet to be
given on the events of 1915 for those who are clamoring for a true
understanding of the causal events that led to the overlapping tragedies
of those turbulent years. The matter simply has not been studied
sufficiently by independent sources who bear no allegiance -- emotional
or otherwise -- to either side. Much of what has been written is either
by Turkish or Armenian historians or researchers -- who can hardly be
impartial in a matter like this -- or their sympathizers. The names that
come to mind immediately here are Arnold Toynbee, Israel Charny, Taner
Akçam, Christopher J. Walker, Esat Uras, and Sadi Koçaþ -- to list
but just a few.
But then the Turkish-Armenian dispute today has little to do
with history. It is a typical oriental tale of seeking vengeance,
vindication and retribution. Neither side has attained the social
maturity that would enable them to look together at a bloody past with
a view to drawing the true lessons about man's inhumanity to man. Put
bluntly the blood feud mentality goes on with no sight in end. Had the
eminent members of TARC displayed more maturity, wisdom and courage
things might have been different. But this was clearly not to be.
[Reconciliation] Why is it impossible?
Turkish Daily News
Jan 9 2002
Why is it impossible?
BY GUNDUZ AKTAN, ANKARA - TURKISH DAILY NEWS
Criticizing Armenians who had joined the Turco-Armenian
Reconciliation Commission (TARC), the Dashnak Party (ARF) and the ANC
stated that they were against any dialogue with Turkey unless the
latter recognized the Armenian genocide. They say major breakthroughs
have been made for the recognition of the genocide in French, Italian
and European Parliaments,but not in the U.S. House of
Representatives, which declined to recognize the genocide at the last
minute. But the ARF and ANC claimed with a little persuasion the
entire world would recognize it and Armenia would negotiate from a
position of strength with Turkey the land and compensation questions.
However, they felt that TARC has prevented these developments.
Since moderate Armenians, under the influence of these opinions,
failed to support TARC, it is necessary to reiterate what those who
represent the general line of the Turkish public opinion can accept
or reject regarding the genocide allegation.
Many Turkish experts have repeatedly stated the 1915-1916 events were
a tragedy. They noted that the number of Armenians who died during
these events, varied from 200,000 to 600,000. The Armenians lost
their houses, jobs, monuments, and lands which they called homeland.
Families were dispersed, wealth destroyed. It is easier than
generally expected for the Turks, 30-40 percent of whom immigrated
from the Balkans, to feel empathy for the Armenians.
However, there are also things that the Turkish people can never
forget:
Isn't known that the Armenians rebelled many times since the 1860s
for independence under the pretext of reforms and autonomy, as did
the Balkan Christians. They established the Hunchak and Dashnak
organizations to this end. They massacred civilian Turks by a form of
violence which is defined today as terrorism. Thus they provoked the
Turks to kill in return the Armenian civilians in order to urge big
powers to intervene on their behalf. Not only the Turks but also the
Armenians said and wrote these facts.
Since 1830, Russia transferred the Armenians from Anatolia and Iran
to the Caucasus, while driving away the Turks and Muslims to Anatolia
through ethnic cleansing.
During World War I, Armenian rebels fought in cooperation with the
Russian Army, which invaded Anatolia, in order to gain their
independence. They stabbed the Ottoman armies in the back. Due to the
fact that their population constituted only 16 percent of the total
in the region they called Armenia, the ethnic cleansing they carried
out to become majority was very cruel. Isn't this the historical
truth?
Was not the relocation decision taken for this reason?
The relocation caused much less harm when compared with the ethnic
cleansing carried out by the Russians in the Caucasus and the
Christians in the Balkans by attacking the Turkish civilian masses
with their armies. The highest number of deaths happened among those
who had to flee from the Russian and Ottoman armies in Eastern
Anatolia without having time to take any precautions. In this
respect, isn't it a fact that 1,250,000 Turks and Muslims died in
this region as recorded by German, Armenian and Ottoman sources?
In short, unlike the Jews, the Armenians formed a "political" group
conducting military operations with political aims. Various crime may
also be committed against civilian members of a political group, but
these crimes do not fall within the scope of the Genocide Convention.
Moreover unlike anti-Semites, Turks had never intended to destroy
Armenians because they were Armenians. According to the Convention,
this intention can only be present if there is a racial hatred.
Contrary to the claims of the movie "Ararat," the Turks never hated
Armenians.
Isn't that the reaons why the Armenians try to avoid legal conflict
resolution mechanisms? The holocaust was the verdict reached at the
Nurnberg trials and quite naturally recognized by the world. The
Armenians, ont he other hand, tried hard to convince certain
parliaments to recognize the genocidethrough lobbying activities,
backed up with huge amounts of money or through threatening MPs not
to vote in the electionss. In other words, their efforts get the
recognition of genocide are artificial. Isn't there some differences
between the two cases?
The Dashnaks, who joined the Russians in carrying out ethnic
cleansing against the Turks with their 16 percent of the population,
had in fact the main responsibility for the relocation. The only way
to put the blame of this horrible responsibility on the Turks is
through a genocide claim.
The Turks, 5 million of whom died in the Balkans and the Caucasus due
to ethnic cleansing, and another 5 million were forced to immigrate
to Anatolia, cannot recognize a limited relocation as genocide while
their tragedies are relegated to oblivion. That may be known!
-----------
Copyright 2001, Turkish Daily News. This article is redistributed with
permission for personal use of Groong readers. No part of this article
may be reproduced, further distributed or archived without the prior
permission of the publisher. Contact Turkish Daily News Online at
http://www.TurkishDailyNews.com for details.
-----------
Jan 9 2002
Why is it impossible?
BY GUNDUZ AKTAN, ANKARA - TURKISH DAILY NEWS
Criticizing Armenians who had joined the Turco-Armenian
Reconciliation Commission (TARC), the Dashnak Party (ARF) and the ANC
stated that they were against any dialogue with Turkey unless the
latter recognized the Armenian genocide. They say major breakthroughs
have been made for the recognition of the genocide in French, Italian
and European Parliaments,but not in the U.S. House of
Representatives, which declined to recognize the genocide at the last
minute. But the ARF and ANC claimed with a little persuasion the
entire world would recognize it and Armenia would negotiate from a
position of strength with Turkey the land and compensation questions.
However, they felt that TARC has prevented these developments.
Since moderate Armenians, under the influence of these opinions,
failed to support TARC, it is necessary to reiterate what those who
represent the general line of the Turkish public opinion can accept
or reject regarding the genocide allegation.
Many Turkish experts have repeatedly stated the 1915-1916 events were
a tragedy. They noted that the number of Armenians who died during
these events, varied from 200,000 to 600,000. The Armenians lost
their houses, jobs, monuments, and lands which they called homeland.
Families were dispersed, wealth destroyed. It is easier than
generally expected for the Turks, 30-40 percent of whom immigrated
from the Balkans, to feel empathy for the Armenians.
However, there are also things that the Turkish people can never
forget:
Isn't known that the Armenians rebelled many times since the 1860s
for independence under the pretext of reforms and autonomy, as did
the Balkan Christians. They established the Hunchak and Dashnak
organizations to this end. They massacred civilian Turks by a form of
violence which is defined today as terrorism. Thus they provoked the
Turks to kill in return the Armenian civilians in order to urge big
powers to intervene on their behalf. Not only the Turks but also the
Armenians said and wrote these facts.
Since 1830, Russia transferred the Armenians from Anatolia and Iran
to the Caucasus, while driving away the Turks and Muslims to Anatolia
through ethnic cleansing.
During World War I, Armenian rebels fought in cooperation with the
Russian Army, which invaded Anatolia, in order to gain their
independence. They stabbed the Ottoman armies in the back. Due to the
fact that their population constituted only 16 percent of the total
in the region they called Armenia, the ethnic cleansing they carried
out to become majority was very cruel. Isn't this the historical
truth?
Was not the relocation decision taken for this reason?
The relocation caused much less harm when compared with the ethnic
cleansing carried out by the Russians in the Caucasus and the
Christians in the Balkans by attacking the Turkish civilian masses
with their armies. The highest number of deaths happened among those
who had to flee from the Russian and Ottoman armies in Eastern
Anatolia without having time to take any precautions. In this
respect, isn't it a fact that 1,250,000 Turks and Muslims died in
this region as recorded by German, Armenian and Ottoman sources?
In short, unlike the Jews, the Armenians formed a "political" group
conducting military operations with political aims. Various crime may
also be committed against civilian members of a political group, but
these crimes do not fall within the scope of the Genocide Convention.
Moreover unlike anti-Semites, Turks had never intended to destroy
Armenians because they were Armenians. According to the Convention,
this intention can only be present if there is a racial hatred.
Contrary to the claims of the movie "Ararat," the Turks never hated
Armenians.
Isn't that the reaons why the Armenians try to avoid legal conflict
resolution mechanisms? The holocaust was the verdict reached at the
Nurnberg trials and quite naturally recognized by the world. The
Armenians, ont he other hand, tried hard to convince certain
parliaments to recognize the genocidethrough lobbying activities,
backed up with huge amounts of money or through threatening MPs not
to vote in the electionss. In other words, their efforts get the
recognition of genocide are artificial. Isn't there some differences
between the two cases?
The Dashnaks, who joined the Russians in carrying out ethnic
cleansing against the Turks with their 16 percent of the population,
had in fact the main responsibility for the relocation. The only way
to put the blame of this horrible responsibility on the Turks is
through a genocide claim.
The Turks, 5 million of whom died in the Balkans and the Caucasus due
to ethnic cleansing, and another 5 million were forced to immigrate
to Anatolia, cannot recognize a limited relocation as genocide while
their tragedies are relegated to oblivion. That may be known!
-----------
Copyright 2001, Turkish Daily News. This article is redistributed with
permission for personal use of Groong readers. No part of this article
may be reproduced, further distributed or archived without the prior
permission of the publisher. Contact Turkish Daily News Online at
http://www.TurkishDailyNews.com for details.
-----------
NEWS ANALYSIS: Will Turkish-Armenian dialogue remain as a memory of
Turkish Daily News
Jan 9 2002
NEWS ANALYSIS: Will Turkish-Armenian dialogue remain as a memory of
the year 2001?
BY SAADET ORUC, ANKARA - TURKISH DAILY NEWS
Despite the foreign policy projections of 2001 that Turkey would put
weight on the forming of diplomatic contacts with Armenia (but not
diplomatic relations), the efforts for launching a dialogue between
Yerevan and Ankara have failed.
The dialogue mechanism between the journalists of Turkey, Azerbaijan
and Armenia remain as the sole path for the continuation of the
person-to-person dialogue between the two countries.
The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Committee (TARC) had to cease its
mission due to a statement from the Armenian side.
TARC's Armenian members had declared that they would not attend the
commission works on Dec. 12.
Armenian members of the TARC, Alexander Arzumanyan, Van Krikoryan,
David Hovenasyon and Andranik Mihranyan, signed a declaration stating
that they would not attend the commission meetings.
The declaration said that their belief in the normalization of ties
between Turkey and Armenia was continuing.
Following the statement made by the Armenian side, the commission,
which was a historical step for the improvement of the ties between
Turkey and Armenia, halted its work.
The TARC process in the year 2001, which was being evaluated as a
product of the resolution processes in western parliaments by a
foreign diplomat involved in Turkish-Armenian relations, has had to
be stopped as the nationalists of the two sides were not involved in
the reconciliation process.
Taking lessons from the past processes, it was stated that all sides
of the societies should be expressing concerns, and everything should
be put on the table, without avoiding discussing the existing
problems between the two states.
Within the framework of Washington's efforts to encourage ties
between Turkey and Armenia, U.S. Ambassador in Yerevan John Ordway
was quoted as saying recently by the Anatolia news agency that the
border between Turkey and Armenia, as well as the one between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, should be opened for the improvement of the
economy of the region.
Michael Lemmon, the former U.S. ambassador in Yerevan, has been
acting as Turkish Ambassador in Yerevan and Armenian Ambassador in
Turkey, with his efforts to help the development of the relationships
between the two states are being considered.
TABDC urges the opening of the border gate
In a press release signed jointly by the Turkish and Armenian
co-chairmen of the Turkish Armenian Business Development Council
(TABDC), hope was expressed for the fifth year of the
Turkish-Armenian dialogue process, and urged the necessity of the
opening of the border gate between Turkey and Armenia.
"For many years, Armenians and Turks of good will have been
advocating the wisdom of cooperation. What has been achieved so far
gives us hope and strength for the future. We believe that there is
still a pressing need to cultivate direct ties and that there is much
room for collaboration," said the statement.
"We are convinced that the two separate processes of diplomatic
rapprochement and civil initiatives must go hand in hand. At the
beginning of the new year we want to stress the need for interstate
relations and intergovernmental communication," it said.
Dialogue and interaction between public organizations and business
associations are a prerequisite for establishing mutual
understanding, handling sensitive issues, and achieving prosperity in
our region, it continued.
"From our five years of experience, we have learned that there is no
obstacle for Turks and Armenians to start talking and collaborating.
The closed border is the only barrier preventing us from intensifying
our business and human relations. A closed border that separates us
makes no sense. We can foresee the great potential benefits to be
realized by Armenia and Turkey," it said.
-----------
Copyright 2001, Turkish Daily News. This article is redistributed with
permission for personal use of Groong readers. No part of this article
may be reproduced, further distributed or archived without the prior
permission of the publisher. Contact Turkish Daily News Online at
http://www.TurkishDailyNews.com for details.
-----------
Jan 9 2002
NEWS ANALYSIS: Will Turkish-Armenian dialogue remain as a memory of
the year 2001?
BY SAADET ORUC, ANKARA - TURKISH DAILY NEWS
Despite the foreign policy projections of 2001 that Turkey would put
weight on the forming of diplomatic contacts with Armenia (but not
diplomatic relations), the efforts for launching a dialogue between
Yerevan and Ankara have failed.
The dialogue mechanism between the journalists of Turkey, Azerbaijan
and Armenia remain as the sole path for the continuation of the
person-to-person dialogue between the two countries.
The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Committee (TARC) had to cease its
mission due to a statement from the Armenian side.
TARC's Armenian members had declared that they would not attend the
commission works on Dec. 12.
Armenian members of the TARC, Alexander Arzumanyan, Van Krikoryan,
David Hovenasyon and Andranik Mihranyan, signed a declaration stating
that they would not attend the commission meetings.
The declaration said that their belief in the normalization of ties
between Turkey and Armenia was continuing.
Following the statement made by the Armenian side, the commission,
which was a historical step for the improvement of the ties between
Turkey and Armenia, halted its work.
The TARC process in the year 2001, which was being evaluated as a
product of the resolution processes in western parliaments by a
foreign diplomat involved in Turkish-Armenian relations, has had to
be stopped as the nationalists of the two sides were not involved in
the reconciliation process.
Taking lessons from the past processes, it was stated that all sides
of the societies should be expressing concerns, and everything should
be put on the table, without avoiding discussing the existing
problems between the two states.
Within the framework of Washington's efforts to encourage ties
between Turkey and Armenia, U.S. Ambassador in Yerevan John Ordway
was quoted as saying recently by the Anatolia news agency that the
border between Turkey and Armenia, as well as the one between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, should be opened for the improvement of the
economy of the region.
Michael Lemmon, the former U.S. ambassador in Yerevan, has been
acting as Turkish Ambassador in Yerevan and Armenian Ambassador in
Turkey, with his efforts to help the development of the relationships
between the two states are being considered.
TABDC urges the opening of the border gate
In a press release signed jointly by the Turkish and Armenian
co-chairmen of the Turkish Armenian Business Development Council
(TABDC), hope was expressed for the fifth year of the
Turkish-Armenian dialogue process, and urged the necessity of the
opening of the border gate between Turkey and Armenia.
"For many years, Armenians and Turks of good will have been
advocating the wisdom of cooperation. What has been achieved so far
gives us hope and strength for the future. We believe that there is
still a pressing need to cultivate direct ties and that there is much
room for collaboration," said the statement.
"We are convinced that the two separate processes of diplomatic
rapprochement and civil initiatives must go hand in hand. At the
beginning of the new year we want to stress the need for interstate
relations and intergovernmental communication," it said.
Dialogue and interaction between public organizations and business
associations are a prerequisite for establishing mutual
understanding, handling sensitive issues, and achieving prosperity in
our region, it continued.
"From our five years of experience, we have learned that there is no
obstacle for Turks and Armenians to start talking and collaborating.
The closed border is the only barrier preventing us from intensifying
our business and human relations. A closed border that separates us
makes no sense. We can foresee the great potential benefits to be
realized by Armenia and Turkey," it said.
-----------
Copyright 2001, Turkish Daily News. This article is redistributed with
permission for personal use of Groong readers. No part of this article
may be reproduced, further distributed or archived without the prior
permission of the publisher. Contact Turkish Daily News Online at
http://www.TurkishDailyNews.com for details.
-----------
TARC PROBLEMATICS
TARC PROBLEMATICS
I have been trying to follow the activities of TARC ever
since its formation was made public, but there is not much to
follow. However, I did read the interview two members gave to
Groong on Aug 4, 2001 and I am disturbed by some of the statements
they made.
1) The word `reconcile' has two different meanings, and I wonder
which was meant when the esteemed members of this commission
decided on this term.
a) If it was meant `to restore to friendship', it is ill-chosen,
because friendship is based on trust. When the Turkish members of
the so-called commission announce publicly, unlike the Armenian
members, that there will be no recognition of the genocide, I
wonder how they can be trusted to restore a true friendship. b) If
it was meant `to submit to or accept something unpleasant', then it
has also not been chosen well. From what I read in the interview,
it seems to me that the only reconciliation that is on the TARC's
agenda is to accept the `unpleasant' idea that the Turks will never
admit to committing a horrible crime. It is very clear from the
statements some of the Turk members on the Commission have made
that they will never reconcile with their `unpleasant' past, so I
wonder what the whole purpose of this commission is except that it
serves non-Armenian interests.
2) A commission, whatever its mission, cannot be formed simply on
the basis that the members `have known each other since 1991'.
Knowing each other does not qualify them to decide on the minimum
criteria that they themselves have delineated for those who would
join this so-called Commission. Regardless, I am sure there are
many other Armenians who have significant international and
national political experiences, are fluent in English and willing
to work as part of a team. In fact, it is an insult to my
intelligence when they declare they can decide on who is qualified
and who is not. What is more insulting is that they consider
themselves working as part of a team. What team is that when the
Armenian members have alienated themselves from many Armenians? If
they meant the ill-fated Commission , I still don't consider them
working as a team. From the interview, all I can infer is that they
are not working `as' a team, but `for' a team, which unfortunately
is pro-Turkish. I am not concerned about numbers being 4 to
6. Sometimes one person can have a much better impact than 10.
3) Another point made during the interview is that this `commission
is not focused on determining whether or not there was a genocide.'
The Armenian members take it as a `non-negotiable fact,' but what
about the six Turkish members of TARC? How can the members of this
commission have a constructive discussion if each side is basing
these negotiations on different issues? Perhaps the meetings are
being held in Babylon where each speaks his own language and gets
no where.
4) It was also stated that the members did not play any role in the
selection of the Turkish members and vice versa. The four Armenian
members elected themselves to be on this commission and probably so
did the six Turkish members. But this does not give them the right
to speak for the majority of Armenians, and certainly it does not
give the six Turks the right to speak for the majority of
Turks. The Armenians in general were not consulted. Therefore, what
they decide on or discuss during these meetings will not concern
the majority of Armenians. Whatever `reconciliation' they will have
with this Commission will be theirs, and only their decision. And
only they will be held accountable for their actions.
5) What disturbed me most in the interview was the following
statement: `Armenian-Americans are already divided.' This is
unacceptable from a self-announced expert who is willing to work as
a team. And what makes this statement worse - actually very
childish -- is the attack on the ARF and their unwillingness to
participate in this commission, and that the members of TARC `are
not presently aware of anyone within the ARF/ANCA ranks who can
meet the criteria for membership.' Did they even try to set up
some sort of a `reconciliation commission' with the ARF'? Or do
they consider reconciling with Turks more important than
reconciling with fellow Armenians? Isn't it better to start
cleaning our own house before we even think about our neighbors?
If the ARF knew about the formation of this commission, but refused
to join, did anyone of the commission members try to set up a
`reconciliation' committee with the ARF to agree to some sort of
common ground? In the interview, one member also states that `this
effort ought not be held captive to partisan politics', yet all the
two members do is act as a partisan by attacking the ARF. I have
never been a member of any of the three Armenian Parties, which for
me have become very stagnant by keeping their outdated aims and
objectives. None of the Parties is God-sent, and they all have
their good sides and bad. If I may add here, my father was a
founding member in Jordan of one party, and it was not the ARF. But
he taught me tolerance towards all Armenians, to extend a hand no
matter what. I was also an active member of the AGBU in Lebanon for
more than 20 years.
Living in Lebanon among Arabs and Moslems, all I hear is great
regard towards Armenians -- how nationalistic, loyal and united we
are, and how much they need to learn from us. I know well that we
are forever divided, but I never correct them; I always affirm that
we are united.
Instead of trying to unite the ranks, the actions of this
commission unfortunately have further divided the
Armenian-Americans. In the past year, I grew more and more proud of
the Armenian-Americans who got stronger through the Armenian
lobby. However, this ill-fated Commission has destroyed what the
Armenian community had built for many years despite the many
disagreements amongst themselves.
I do hope this commission will not cause any more destruction of
the Armenian Diaspora who have survived many years in spite of many
misfortunes.
___________________________________
Katia M. Peltekian is an author and lecturer of English and
Technical English as well as Teacher-trainer at the American
University of Beirut, Lebanon. She has recently published a book
`Heralding of the Armenian Genocide - Reports in the Halifax Herald
1894-1922' which is a compilation of newspaper articles in that
Canadian newspaper.
************************************************************
© Copyright 2001, Armenian News Network / Groong, all rights reserved.
I have been trying to follow the activities of TARC ever
since its formation was made public, but there is not much to
follow. However, I did read the interview two members gave to
Groong on Aug 4, 2001 and I am disturbed by some of the statements
they made.
1) The word `reconcile' has two different meanings, and I wonder
which was meant when the esteemed members of this commission
decided on this term.
a) If it was meant `to restore to friendship', it is ill-chosen,
because friendship is based on trust. When the Turkish members of
the so-called commission announce publicly, unlike the Armenian
members, that there will be no recognition of the genocide, I
wonder how they can be trusted to restore a true friendship. b) If
it was meant `to submit to or accept something unpleasant', then it
has also not been chosen well. From what I read in the interview,
it seems to me that the only reconciliation that is on the TARC's
agenda is to accept the `unpleasant' idea that the Turks will never
admit to committing a horrible crime. It is very clear from the
statements some of the Turk members on the Commission have made
that they will never reconcile with their `unpleasant' past, so I
wonder what the whole purpose of this commission is except that it
serves non-Armenian interests.
2) A commission, whatever its mission, cannot be formed simply on
the basis that the members `have known each other since 1991'.
Knowing each other does not qualify them to decide on the minimum
criteria that they themselves have delineated for those who would
join this so-called Commission. Regardless, I am sure there are
many other Armenians who have significant international and
national political experiences, are fluent in English and willing
to work as part of a team. In fact, it is an insult to my
intelligence when they declare they can decide on who is qualified
and who is not. What is more insulting is that they consider
themselves working as part of a team. What team is that when the
Armenian members have alienated themselves from many Armenians? If
they meant the ill-fated Commission , I still don't consider them
working as a team. From the interview, all I can infer is that they
are not working `as' a team, but `for' a team, which unfortunately
is pro-Turkish. I am not concerned about numbers being 4 to
6. Sometimes one person can have a much better impact than 10.
3) Another point made during the interview is that this `commission
is not focused on determining whether or not there was a genocide.'
The Armenian members take it as a `non-negotiable fact,' but what
about the six Turkish members of TARC? How can the members of this
commission have a constructive discussion if each side is basing
these negotiations on different issues? Perhaps the meetings are
being held in Babylon where each speaks his own language and gets
no where.
4) It was also stated that the members did not play any role in the
selection of the Turkish members and vice versa. The four Armenian
members elected themselves to be on this commission and probably so
did the six Turkish members. But this does not give them the right
to speak for the majority of Armenians, and certainly it does not
give the six Turks the right to speak for the majority of
Turks. The Armenians in general were not consulted. Therefore, what
they decide on or discuss during these meetings will not concern
the majority of Armenians. Whatever `reconciliation' they will have
with this Commission will be theirs, and only their decision. And
only they will be held accountable for their actions.
5) What disturbed me most in the interview was the following
statement: `Armenian-Americans are already divided.' This is
unacceptable from a self-announced expert who is willing to work as
a team. And what makes this statement worse - actually very
childish -- is the attack on the ARF and their unwillingness to
participate in this commission, and that the members of TARC `are
not presently aware of anyone within the ARF/ANCA ranks who can
meet the criteria for membership.' Did they even try to set up
some sort of a `reconciliation commission' with the ARF'? Or do
they consider reconciling with Turks more important than
reconciling with fellow Armenians? Isn't it better to start
cleaning our own house before we even think about our neighbors?
If the ARF knew about the formation of this commission, but refused
to join, did anyone of the commission members try to set up a
`reconciliation' committee with the ARF to agree to some sort of
common ground? In the interview, one member also states that `this
effort ought not be held captive to partisan politics', yet all the
two members do is act as a partisan by attacking the ARF. I have
never been a member of any of the three Armenian Parties, which for
me have become very stagnant by keeping their outdated aims and
objectives. None of the Parties is God-sent, and they all have
their good sides and bad. If I may add here, my father was a
founding member in Jordan of one party, and it was not the ARF. But
he taught me tolerance towards all Armenians, to extend a hand no
matter what. I was also an active member of the AGBU in Lebanon for
more than 20 years.
Living in Lebanon among Arabs and Moslems, all I hear is great
regard towards Armenians -- how nationalistic, loyal and united we
are, and how much they need to learn from us. I know well that we
are forever divided, but I never correct them; I always affirm that
we are united.
Instead of trying to unite the ranks, the actions of this
commission unfortunately have further divided the
Armenian-Americans. In the past year, I grew more and more proud of
the Armenian-Americans who got stronger through the Armenian
lobby. However, this ill-fated Commission has destroyed what the
Armenian community had built for many years despite the many
disagreements amongst themselves.
I do hope this commission will not cause any more destruction of
the Armenian Diaspora who have survived many years in spite of many
misfortunes.
___________________________________
Katia M. Peltekian is an author and lecturer of English and
Technical English as well as Teacher-trainer at the American
University of Beirut, Lebanon. She has recently published a book
`Heralding of the Armenian Genocide - Reports in the Halifax Herald
1894-1922' which is a compilation of newspaper articles in that
Canadian newspaper.
************************************************************
© Copyright 2001, Armenian News Network / Groong, all rights reserved.
US top official - Armenian-Turkish reconciliation body "private initiative"
US top official - Armenian-Turkish reconciliation body "private initiative"
Mediamax
28 August 2001
YEREVAN
US Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones said in Yerevan today that
the creation of the Armenian-Turkish "reconciliation commission" was a
"private initiative". Jones said this after a meeting with Armenian President
Robert Kocharyan in reply to a question from Mediamax as to whether the US
administration had anything to do with the creation of the Armenian-Turkish
"reconciliation commission". The assistant secretary of state said at the
same time that the USA was ready to support any initiatives directed at
normalizing relations between the nations.
Mediamax
28 August 2001
YEREVAN
US Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones said in Yerevan today that
the creation of the Armenian-Turkish "reconciliation commission" was a
"private initiative". Jones said this after a meeting with Armenian President
Robert Kocharyan in reply to a question from Mediamax as to whether the US
administration had anything to do with the creation of the Armenian-Turkish
"reconciliation commission". The assistant secretary of state said at the
same time that the USA was ready to support any initiatives directed at
normalizing relations between the nations.
Congressional Report Reveals State Department Funding For TARC
ASBAREZ ONLINE
10/16/2001
1. Congressional Report Reveals State Department Funding For TARC
WASHINGTON, DC (ANCA and RFE/RL)The State Department's public and private
assurances that it was not involved in the formation or operation of the
Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission were dramatically called into
question this week with the release of a Congressional report documenting that
the "Department provided financial assistance to support the Commission's
activities," reported the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA).
The existence of this Commission was first revealed this July by the New York
Times, which reported the group had been meeting secretly since the time of
last year's Armenian Genocide Resolution in the US Congress. White House and
State Department officials have repeatedly denied, both in public statements
and during discussion with the ANCA, that the US government had any role in
the
creation or activities of the Commission. The Congressional report on this
matter was prepared, in response to Congressional inquiries, by the
Congressional Research Service (CRS). The CRS is the highly regarded official
research arm of the US legislative branch. The four page report, entitled,
"Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission and US Role," (dated October 2,
2001) noted that the Turkish reaction to the creation of the Commission "has
been overwhelmingly positive," while the Armenian reaction has been "much more
negative than positive."
On the subject of US State Department funding, the CRS reported that: The
Department provided financial assistance to support the Commission's
activities
as it says it does other civil society initiatives or people to people
contacts. The funds were in the form of a grant to the American University for
a conflict resolution program, which is supporting the activities of the
Commission. (Complete copies of this report can be obtained by contacting a
member of Congress and requesting the study by name and date.) The Armenian
members of a controversial group denied any knowledge of possible US
government
funding for their activities, revealed by a US Congressional report publicized
over the weekend. But they did not rule out the possibility that Washington,
which strongly supports the initiative, has contributed financially to the
work
of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC).
In discussions following the creation of the Commission, Administration
officials assured the ANCA that the Administration did not play any role in
the
creation or activities of the Commission. Administration officials did,
however, inform the ANCA that they viewed the purpose of this body as
essentially providing Congress with an excuse not to pass an Armenian Genocide
Resolution and as a Turkish ploy to head off further recognition of the 1915
Armenian genocide by Western nations, while proponents insist that it could
lay
the groundwork for an eventual Turkish recognition of the tragedy.
The other group active on Capitol Hill, the Armenian Assembly of America,
is a
staunch backer of the TARC. Assembly chairman Van Krikorian is one of the four
Armenian members of the ten-member group. He, on Monday, downplayed the
significance of the Congressional report cited by the ANCA, saying: "From the
beginning, the US government said it was supporting us. So I don't think
that's
a surprise."
But he and two other Armenian members of the TARC, former foreign minister
Alexander Arzumanian and retired diplomat David Hovannisian, did not
confirm or
deny the reported US assistance to the commission, in separate interviews with
RFE/RL. "I don't have such information," said Arzumanian. "I haven't seen any
interference in our work by a single US government official," said
Hovannisian.
"They (the State Department) are saying it's a private initiative, which it
is, but they are supporting it," Krikorian told RFE/RL by phone from New York.
"Maybe they are giving out some grants. But the Armenian members of the
commission have not received any financial assistance from the State
Department."
In a related development, members of the European Parliament recently cited
the existence of the Commission as their justification for dropping a
long-standing provision calling on Turkey to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide
in their annual report on Turkey's progress toward accession into the European
Union. In a sharp reversal for the European Armenians who have worked on this
issue over a period of decades, a key Parliamentary Committee has replaced a
long-standing provision calling upon Turkey to end its denial of the Armenian
Genocide. The panel avoided making any reference to the Genocide, noting
instead that the European Parliament "supports the civil initiative
launched by
a group of former diplomats and academics from Turkey and Armenia, the aim of
which is to arrive at a common understanding of the past." "We are deeply
troubled, first, that our State Department has apparently participated in an
initiative plainly directed at undermining the ability of US citizens to
petition their government of an issue of abiding concern, specifically the
right of Armenian Americans to pursue official recognition of the Armenian
Genocide through the institutions of our democracy," said ANCA Chairman Ken
Hachikian. "We are, at the same time, equally disappointed that our government
has apparently misled our community, both publicly and privately, to hide its
role in this deeply flawed undertaking."
A sample of official US statements denying any government role in the
formation or activities of the Commission is provided below:
* "US Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones said in Yerevan today that
the creation of the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation commission' was a 'private
initiative.' Jones said this after a meeting with Armenian President Robert
Kocharian in reply to a question from Mediamax as to whether the US
administration had anything to do with the creation of the Armenian-Turkish
'reconciliation commission.'" (Mediamax news service, August 28, 2001)
* "The commission on Tuesday received the indirect support of the United
States. Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones told reporters in Yerevan
that Washington welcomes any initiative aimed at a normalization of ties
between Armenia and Turkey. But she denied any US government involvement in
the
'private' dialogue." (RFE/RL Armenia Report, August 29, 2001)
* "To what extent was the US State Department supporting this [Turkish
Armenian Reconciliation Commission]? Jones denied her department's
participation, saying that, 'this is only an individual initiative.'" (Hayots
Ashkhar, August 29, 2001)
* "The Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission is a private initiative. US
Deputy State Secretary on countries of Europe and Eurasia, Elizabeth Jones,
announced to journalists in Yerevan." (ARKA News Agency, August 29, 2001)
* "During a recent visit to Armenia, US Assistant Secretary of State
Elizabeth
Jones denied any US government involvement in the 'private' dialogue, but
Western media reports have said the State Department actively encouraged the
secret negotiations." (RFE/RL, September 8, 2001) "Sadly this revelation only
compounds the serious credibility issues created by the State Department's
long-standing complicity in Turkey's denials of the Armenian Genocide," added
Hachikian. "The State Department certainly owes the Armenian American
community
a full accounting of its role in this Commission and an explanation about what
appears, by all accounts, to be a clear pattern of misrepresentation aimed at
denying American citizens information to which they are rightfully entitled,
information which they require in order to make informed judgments about
profound issues of public policy - namely our national response to the
crime of
genocide."
For additional information on the Commission, visit:
http://www.asbarez.com/TARC/Tarc.html
(c) 2001 ASBAREZ ONLINE. All Rights Reserved.
10/16/2001
1. Congressional Report Reveals State Department Funding For TARC
WASHINGTON, DC (ANCA and RFE/RL)The State Department's public and private
assurances that it was not involved in the formation or operation of the
Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission were dramatically called into
question this week with the release of a Congressional report documenting that
the "Department provided financial assistance to support the Commission's
activities," reported the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA).
The existence of this Commission was first revealed this July by the New York
Times, which reported the group had been meeting secretly since the time of
last year's Armenian Genocide Resolution in the US Congress. White House and
State Department officials have repeatedly denied, both in public statements
and during discussion with the ANCA, that the US government had any role in
the
creation or activities of the Commission. The Congressional report on this
matter was prepared, in response to Congressional inquiries, by the
Congressional Research Service (CRS). The CRS is the highly regarded official
research arm of the US legislative branch. The four page report, entitled,
"Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission and US Role," (dated October 2,
2001) noted that the Turkish reaction to the creation of the Commission "has
been overwhelmingly positive," while the Armenian reaction has been "much more
negative than positive."
On the subject of US State Department funding, the CRS reported that: The
Department provided financial assistance to support the Commission's
activities
as it says it does other civil society initiatives or people to people
contacts. The funds were in the form of a grant to the American University for
a conflict resolution program, which is supporting the activities of the
Commission. (Complete copies of this report can be obtained by contacting a
member of Congress and requesting the study by name and date.) The Armenian
members of a controversial group denied any knowledge of possible US
government
funding for their activities, revealed by a US Congressional report publicized
over the weekend. But they did not rule out the possibility that Washington,
which strongly supports the initiative, has contributed financially to the
work
of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC).
In discussions following the creation of the Commission, Administration
officials assured the ANCA that the Administration did not play any role in
the
creation or activities of the Commission. Administration officials did,
however, inform the ANCA that they viewed the purpose of this body as
essentially providing Congress with an excuse not to pass an Armenian Genocide
Resolution and as a Turkish ploy to head off further recognition of the 1915
Armenian genocide by Western nations, while proponents insist that it could
lay
the groundwork for an eventual Turkish recognition of the tragedy.
The other group active on Capitol Hill, the Armenian Assembly of America,
is a
staunch backer of the TARC. Assembly chairman Van Krikorian is one of the four
Armenian members of the ten-member group. He, on Monday, downplayed the
significance of the Congressional report cited by the ANCA, saying: "From the
beginning, the US government said it was supporting us. So I don't think
that's
a surprise."
But he and two other Armenian members of the TARC, former foreign minister
Alexander Arzumanian and retired diplomat David Hovannisian, did not
confirm or
deny the reported US assistance to the commission, in separate interviews with
RFE/RL. "I don't have such information," said Arzumanian. "I haven't seen any
interference in our work by a single US government official," said
Hovannisian.
"They (the State Department) are saying it's a private initiative, which it
is, but they are supporting it," Krikorian told RFE/RL by phone from New York.
"Maybe they are giving out some grants. But the Armenian members of the
commission have not received any financial assistance from the State
Department."
In a related development, members of the European Parliament recently cited
the existence of the Commission as their justification for dropping a
long-standing provision calling on Turkey to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide
in their annual report on Turkey's progress toward accession into the European
Union. In a sharp reversal for the European Armenians who have worked on this
issue over a period of decades, a key Parliamentary Committee has replaced a
long-standing provision calling upon Turkey to end its denial of the Armenian
Genocide. The panel avoided making any reference to the Genocide, noting
instead that the European Parliament "supports the civil initiative
launched by
a group of former diplomats and academics from Turkey and Armenia, the aim of
which is to arrive at a common understanding of the past." "We are deeply
troubled, first, that our State Department has apparently participated in an
initiative plainly directed at undermining the ability of US citizens to
petition their government of an issue of abiding concern, specifically the
right of Armenian Americans to pursue official recognition of the Armenian
Genocide through the institutions of our democracy," said ANCA Chairman Ken
Hachikian. "We are, at the same time, equally disappointed that our government
has apparently misled our community, both publicly and privately, to hide its
role in this deeply flawed undertaking."
A sample of official US statements denying any government role in the
formation or activities of the Commission is provided below:
* "US Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones said in Yerevan today that
the creation of the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation commission' was a 'private
initiative.' Jones said this after a meeting with Armenian President Robert
Kocharian in reply to a question from Mediamax as to whether the US
administration had anything to do with the creation of the Armenian-Turkish
'reconciliation commission.'" (Mediamax news service, August 28, 2001)
* "The commission on Tuesday received the indirect support of the United
States. Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones told reporters in Yerevan
that Washington welcomes any initiative aimed at a normalization of ties
between Armenia and Turkey. But she denied any US government involvement in
the
'private' dialogue." (RFE/RL Armenia Report, August 29, 2001)
* "To what extent was the US State Department supporting this [Turkish
Armenian Reconciliation Commission]? Jones denied her department's
participation, saying that, 'this is only an individual initiative.'" (Hayots
Ashkhar, August 29, 2001)
* "The Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission is a private initiative. US
Deputy State Secretary on countries of Europe and Eurasia, Elizabeth Jones,
announced to journalists in Yerevan." (ARKA News Agency, August 29, 2001)
* "During a recent visit to Armenia, US Assistant Secretary of State
Elizabeth
Jones denied any US government involvement in the 'private' dialogue, but
Western media reports have said the State Department actively encouraged the
secret negotiations." (RFE/RL, September 8, 2001) "Sadly this revelation only
compounds the serious credibility issues created by the State Department's
long-standing complicity in Turkey's denials of the Armenian Genocide," added
Hachikian. "The State Department certainly owes the Armenian American
community
a full accounting of its role in this Commission and an explanation about what
appears, by all accounts, to be a clear pattern of misrepresentation aimed at
denying American citizens information to which they are rightfully entitled,
information which they require in order to make informed judgments about
profound issues of public policy - namely our national response to the
crime of
genocide."
For additional information on the Commission, visit:
http://www.asbarez.com/TARC/Tarc.html
(c) 2001 ASBAREZ ONLINE. All Rights Reserved.
CHANGE OF GENERATIONS IN POLITICAL ELITE OF TURKEY MAY BE INSTRUMENTAL IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA
Noyan Tapan News Agency
http://www.noyan-tapan.am/
DAVID HOVHANNISSIAN:
CHANGE OF GENERATIONS IN POLITICAL ELITE OF TURKEY MAY
BE INSTRUMENTAL IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA
YEREVAN, July 17 (Noyan Tapan). The current period in
Turkish political life, when a change of generations of
politicians is taking place, is one of the most tense ones; at
the same time it rekindles certain hopes in terms of possible
shifts in Armenian-Turkish relations, a member of the
Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, senior lecturer at Yerevan
State University David Hovhannissian said in an interview with
NT's correspondent.
According to Hovhannissian, the elder generation, whose
embodiment is Premier Ecevit, is retiring from the political
arena without preparing a substitution. The generation that
comes to replace the current one has a more liberal way of
thinking and is not bound by stereotypes. In his opinion, it is
important for the domestic life of Turkey and also from the
viewpoint of Armenian-Turkish relations, for it may play a
positive role in establishing normal relations with Armenia.
He pointed out that the well-known Turkish position,
according to which the opening of borders and establishment of
diplomatic relations with Armenia is linked with Azerbaijan and
the Karabakh conflict, has not undergone any change. However,
during negotiations within the framework of the TARC, where
global problems existing between the two nations were discussed
at the level of representatives of civil societies, it was
pointed out, including by the Turkish side, that the opening of
borders between the two countries would promote a better climate
in bilateral relations as well as in the whole region.
Hovhannissian expressed confidence that a real peace
between the two communities can be based only on Turkey's
recognizing the fact of the Armenian Genocide. According to him,
it is a problem of Armenia's national security. "Of course, the
Genocide becomes an internationally recognized fact, but one can
make sure that it never repeats through Turkish admission only,"
the ambassador emphasized. He thinks that even the discussions
within the framework of the commission help increase the level
of Armenia's national security.
(c) Copyright 2001, Noyan Tapan News Agency.
All Rights Reserved, All reproduction prohibited.
All inquiries to:
Noyan Tapan Information & Analytical Center
E-mail: nt2@noyan-tapan.am
Tel & Fax: (3742) 56-59-65, (3742) 52-42-79
http://www.noyan-tapan.am/
http://www.noyan-tapan.am/
DAVID HOVHANNISSIAN:
CHANGE OF GENERATIONS IN POLITICAL ELITE OF TURKEY MAY
BE INSTRUMENTAL IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA
YEREVAN, July 17 (Noyan Tapan). The current period in
Turkish political life, when a change of generations of
politicians is taking place, is one of the most tense ones; at
the same time it rekindles certain hopes in terms of possible
shifts in Armenian-Turkish relations, a member of the
Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC), Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, senior lecturer at Yerevan
State University David Hovhannissian said in an interview with
NT's correspondent.
According to Hovhannissian, the elder generation, whose
embodiment is Premier Ecevit, is retiring from the political
arena without preparing a substitution. The generation that
comes to replace the current one has a more liberal way of
thinking and is not bound by stereotypes. In his opinion, it is
important for the domestic life of Turkey and also from the
viewpoint of Armenian-Turkish relations, for it may play a
positive role in establishing normal relations with Armenia.
He pointed out that the well-known Turkish position,
according to which the opening of borders and establishment of
diplomatic relations with Armenia is linked with Azerbaijan and
the Karabakh conflict, has not undergone any change. However,
during negotiations within the framework of the TARC, where
global problems existing between the two nations were discussed
at the level of representatives of civil societies, it was
pointed out, including by the Turkish side, that the opening of
borders between the two countries would promote a better climate
in bilateral relations as well as in the whole region.
Hovhannissian expressed confidence that a real peace
between the two communities can be based only on Turkey's
recognizing the fact of the Armenian Genocide. According to him,
it is a problem of Armenia's national security. "Of course, the
Genocide becomes an internationally recognized fact, but one can
make sure that it never repeats through Turkish admission only,"
the ambassador emphasized. He thinks that even the discussions
within the framework of the commission help increase the level
of Armenia's national security.
(c) Copyright 2001, Noyan Tapan News Agency.
All Rights Reserved, All reproduction prohibited.
All inquiries to:
Noyan Tapan Information & Analytical Center
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Justin McCarthy: UN definition of genocide is meaningless
UN definition of genocide is meaningless
By Justin McCarthy
Turkish Daily News
Friday February 28, 2003
A brief analysis of the recent statement of The International Center
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ):
It must first be understood that the ICTJ statement that the word
"genocide" can be applied to what happened to the Armenians is
true. They applied the UN Genocide Convention definitions to the
history of one group, the Armenians, during World War I. Note what
ICTJ states as defining the so-called genocide:
i) The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
ii) Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group
iii) The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of
similar conduct directed against that group.
All of those statements were true of the so-called "Armenian
Genocide." There were indeed many Muslims of Eastern Anatolia who
killed Armenians. That fulfills the definition. Indeed, the definition
is fulfilled whenever two "national, ethnical, racial, or religious
groups" fight each other.
The basic problem is that the UN definition of genocide is essentially
meaningless. It can be applied to almost any conflict. The most
dangerous problem is that, once the word genocide is used, people
do not think of the UN definition. They think of what Hitler did to
the Jews. Those who read that the ICTJ has decided that the Turks
committed genocide will seldom read the quasi-legal document produced
by the ICTJ. Often they will not even know there is a UN Genocide
Convention. Instead, their prejudices will be reinforced. Their
knowledge will not be increased. They will blame the Turks without
knowing anything of the real history of the events.
By the UN definition there indeed was a genocide of the
Armenians. There also was a genocide of the Muslims and a genocide of
the Turks. When the Armenian Nationalists killed the Muslims of Van,
was that not genocide? When they rounded up the villagers around Van,
herded them into the great natural bowl in Zeve, then killed them,
was that not genocide? Was the Armenian murder of the innocent and
unarmed Muslims of Erzurum, Erzincan, Tercan, and so many other places
not genocide?
Beyond the fact that the UN definition is meaningless there are some
extremely troubling facets to the ICTJ analysis: They state, "This
memorandum is a legal, not a factual or historical analysis." How,
one might ask, can anyone make a decision on the events of World
War I without an historical analysis? Of course, ICTJ does make an
historical analysis. Indeed, they also make a "factual analysis," using
a very selected group of facts. While a number of what may be called
the standard works of the Armenian Cause are cited, only one brief
book published by Turkish Government and some Government web sites
are cited (thus reinforcing the erroneous view that only the Turkish
Government objects to the Armenian version of history.) Reading the
text, it is obvious that the authors completely adopted the Armenian
Nationalists' view of history. They do not seem to have attempted
to consider the other side. Had they done so, they would have seen
that applying the word "genocide" only to the Turks was anything but
a neutral statement of fact.
If one only utilizes the fabrications in sources such as the Bryce
Report or the missionary reports, then "genocide" is a foregone
conclusion. Those books contain few dead Turks. The only suffering
mentioned is Armenian suffering. Using only such sources results in a
complete distortion of history. World War I propaganda becomes modern
propaganda, dressed in a legalistic package.
I have no idea of the process used in naming the ICTJ to make
this decision. Nor do I know how the ICTJ went about making their
decision. Perhaps their good will was wrongly assumed. More likely,
they simply did not know what they were doing. They may have believed
they were making a simple legal statement that needed little historical
analysis. That is a sure path to error, because those who believe they
do not need to study history all too often accept what they have always
been told without examining the facts, exactly what happened here.
I have supported and still support the concept of a Turkish Armenian
Reconciliation Commission. Anything that brings contending sides
together to discuss their differences is good. But the TARC made a
false step in asking the ICTJ for their opinion. I have never agreed
with the idea of submitting historical questions to lawyers for final
answers. What is need is a commission of historians, not a commission
of lawyers.
--
******************************
Dr. Dennis R. Papazian
Professor of History
Director, Armenian Research Center
The University of Michigan-Dearborn
Dearborn, MI 48128-1491
313-593-5181
Fax 313-593-5219
Home Fax 248-641-0128
URL www.umd.umich.edu/dept/armenian
*************************************
By Justin McCarthy
Turkish Daily News
Friday February 28, 2003
A brief analysis of the recent statement of The International Center
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ):
It must first be understood that the ICTJ statement that the word
"genocide" can be applied to what happened to the Armenians is
true. They applied the UN Genocide Convention definitions to the
history of one group, the Armenians, during World War I. Note what
ICTJ states as defining the so-called genocide:
i) The perpetrator killed one or more persons.
ii) Such person or persons belonged to a particular national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group
iii) The conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of
similar conduct directed against that group.
All of those statements were true of the so-called "Armenian
Genocide." There were indeed many Muslims of Eastern Anatolia who
killed Armenians. That fulfills the definition. Indeed, the definition
is fulfilled whenever two "national, ethnical, racial, or religious
groups" fight each other.
The basic problem is that the UN definition of genocide is essentially
meaningless. It can be applied to almost any conflict. The most
dangerous problem is that, once the word genocide is used, people
do not think of the UN definition. They think of what Hitler did to
the Jews. Those who read that the ICTJ has decided that the Turks
committed genocide will seldom read the quasi-legal document produced
by the ICTJ. Often they will not even know there is a UN Genocide
Convention. Instead, their prejudices will be reinforced. Their
knowledge will not be increased. They will blame the Turks without
knowing anything of the real history of the events.
By the UN definition there indeed was a genocide of the
Armenians. There also was a genocide of the Muslims and a genocide of
the Turks. When the Armenian Nationalists killed the Muslims of Van,
was that not genocide? When they rounded up the villagers around Van,
herded them into the great natural bowl in Zeve, then killed them,
was that not genocide? Was the Armenian murder of the innocent and
unarmed Muslims of Erzurum, Erzincan, Tercan, and so many other places
not genocide?
Beyond the fact that the UN definition is meaningless there are some
extremely troubling facets to the ICTJ analysis: They state, "This
memorandum is a legal, not a factual or historical analysis." How,
one might ask, can anyone make a decision on the events of World
War I without an historical analysis? Of course, ICTJ does make an
historical analysis. Indeed, they also make a "factual analysis," using
a very selected group of facts. While a number of what may be called
the standard works of the Armenian Cause are cited, only one brief
book published by Turkish Government and some Government web sites
are cited (thus reinforcing the erroneous view that only the Turkish
Government objects to the Armenian version of history.) Reading the
text, it is obvious that the authors completely adopted the Armenian
Nationalists' view of history. They do not seem to have attempted
to consider the other side. Had they done so, they would have seen
that applying the word "genocide" only to the Turks was anything but
a neutral statement of fact.
If one only utilizes the fabrications in sources such as the Bryce
Report or the missionary reports, then "genocide" is a foregone
conclusion. Those books contain few dead Turks. The only suffering
mentioned is Armenian suffering. Using only such sources results in a
complete distortion of history. World War I propaganda becomes modern
propaganda, dressed in a legalistic package.
I have no idea of the process used in naming the ICTJ to make
this decision. Nor do I know how the ICTJ went about making their
decision. Perhaps their good will was wrongly assumed. More likely,
they simply did not know what they were doing. They may have believed
they were making a simple legal statement that needed little historical
analysis. That is a sure path to error, because those who believe they
do not need to study history all too often accept what they have always
been told without examining the facts, exactly what happened here.
I have supported and still support the concept of a Turkish Armenian
Reconciliation Commission. Anything that brings contending sides
together to discuss their differences is good. But the TARC made a
false step in asking the ICTJ for their opinion. I have never agreed
with the idea of submitting historical questions to lawyers for final
answers. What is need is a commission of historians, not a commission
of lawyers.
--
******************************
Dr. Dennis R. Papazian
Professor of History
Director, Armenian Research Center
The University of Michigan-Dearborn
Dearborn, MI 48128-1491
313-593-5181
Fax 313-593-5219
Home Fax 248-641-0128
URL www.umd.umich.edu/dept/armenian
*************************************
Lutem Praises TARC for AAA
The Armenian Weekly On-Line: AWOL
October 20-26, 2001
80 Bigelow Avenue
Watertown MA 02472 USA
(617) 926-3974
armenianweekly@mediaone.net
http://www.hairenik.org
http://www.asbarez.com/TARC/Tarc.html
Lutem Praises TARC for AAA
By Hasmik Dombalagian
In early September, I was looking for information about the Turkish
Armenian Reconciliation Commission on the Internet. I came across a
list of "Reactions and Commendations" on the Web site of the Armenian
Assembly of America. In the list of favorable comments from the Turkish
establishment, the Armenian Assembly included a quote from Omer Lutem.
Omer Lutem is a retired ambassador and the head of the newly founded
"Institute for Armenian Research" in Ankara. The Armenian Assembly
quotes Lutem as saying that he believes the benefit of these kinds of
attempts [TARC] may be the softening of the strained atmosphere between
the two states and nations. He is also quoted on the Web site as
telling the Turkish Daily news, "There is no doubt that this attempt
will be useful in lessening the strain, especially when there is a lack
of diplomatic relations between the two states. But I am not sure how
far this attempt will go." I am familiar with the name of Omer Lutem
because his "Institute for Armenian Research" recently published the
first issue of its journal, "Armenian Studies." In that journal, Lutem
presents the revisionist, anti-Armenian writings of so-called
historians including Justin McCarthy and Sukru Elekdag.
If this is the type of work Lutem is publishing, then what kind of
credibility does his opinion hold? If this is the type of person who
thinks initiatives like TARC will "benefit the strained atmosphere,"
then should Armenians or others be more skeptical of TARC? Does the
Armenian Assembly consider people like Lutem friends, and do they
expect the Armenian community to embrace their endorsements? Even if
Lutem spoke out against TARC, is he considered a reliable source of
information and opinion? After reading Dr. Murat Acemoglu's recent
article about the Omer Lutem and the "Institute for Armenian Research,"
titled "The Turkish Mentality Hasn't Changed Since the Formation of
TARC," I went back to the Armenian Assembly Web site at the end of
September. I noticed that Lutem's name was removed from the Web site.
Perhaps a member of the Armenian Assembly warned them of the views of
their new friend, but that does not change the fact that it is the
Turkish establishment and their friends who are embracing TARC.
Throughout this entire process, I have found it curious that while TARC
is being promoted as an individual endeavor, the Armenian Assembly is
actively promoting its success. I am wondering whether if TARC fails,
it will also mean the failure of the Armenian Assembly. I am wondering
if the Armenian-American community will allow an organization which
promotes Turkish interests to continue operating in our community.
(c) 2001 Armenian Weekly On-Line. All Rights Reserved.
The Armenian Weekly provides this news service to the Armenian News
Network/Groong. AWOL materials are for academic research and personal
use only; they may not be otherwise reproduced without the written
consent of the Armenian Weekly.
October 20-26, 2001
80 Bigelow Avenue
Watertown MA 02472 USA
(617) 926-3974
armenianweekly@mediaone.net
http://www.hairenik.org
http://www.asbarez.com/TARC/Tarc.html
Lutem Praises TARC for AAA
By Hasmik Dombalagian
In early September, I was looking for information about the Turkish
Armenian Reconciliation Commission on the Internet. I came across a
list of "Reactions and Commendations" on the Web site of the Armenian
Assembly of America. In the list of favorable comments from the Turkish
establishment, the Armenian Assembly included a quote from Omer Lutem.
Omer Lutem is a retired ambassador and the head of the newly founded
"Institute for Armenian Research" in Ankara. The Armenian Assembly
quotes Lutem as saying that he believes the benefit of these kinds of
attempts [TARC] may be the softening of the strained atmosphere between
the two states and nations. He is also quoted on the Web site as
telling the Turkish Daily news, "There is no doubt that this attempt
will be useful in lessening the strain, especially when there is a lack
of diplomatic relations between the two states. But I am not sure how
far this attempt will go." I am familiar with the name of Omer Lutem
because his "Institute for Armenian Research" recently published the
first issue of its journal, "Armenian Studies." In that journal, Lutem
presents the revisionist, anti-Armenian writings of so-called
historians including Justin McCarthy and Sukru Elekdag.
If this is the type of work Lutem is publishing, then what kind of
credibility does his opinion hold? If this is the type of person who
thinks initiatives like TARC will "benefit the strained atmosphere,"
then should Armenians or others be more skeptical of TARC? Does the
Armenian Assembly consider people like Lutem friends, and do they
expect the Armenian community to embrace their endorsements? Even if
Lutem spoke out against TARC, is he considered a reliable source of
information and opinion? After reading Dr. Murat Acemoglu's recent
article about the Omer Lutem and the "Institute for Armenian Research,"
titled "The Turkish Mentality Hasn't Changed Since the Formation of
TARC," I went back to the Armenian Assembly Web site at the end of
September. I noticed that Lutem's name was removed from the Web site.
Perhaps a member of the Armenian Assembly warned them of the views of
their new friend, but that does not change the fact that it is the
Turkish establishment and their friends who are embracing TARC.
Throughout this entire process, I have found it curious that while TARC
is being promoted as an individual endeavor, the Armenian Assembly is
actively promoting its success. I am wondering whether if TARC fails,
it will also mean the failure of the Armenian Assembly. I am wondering
if the Armenian-American community will allow an organization which
promotes Turkish interests to continue operating in our community.
(c) 2001 Armenian Weekly On-Line. All Rights Reserved.
The Armenian Weekly provides this news service to the Armenian News
Network/Groong. AWOL materials are for academic research and personal
use only; they may not be otherwise reproduced without the written
consent of the Armenian Weekly.
ICTJ Analysis on Applicability of UN Convention on Genocides pre-1951
ICTJ Analysis on Applicability of UN Convention on Genocides pre-1951
Armenian News Network / Groong
February 10, 2003
TURKISH-ARMENIAN RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TARC) STATEMENT
The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) requested
that the International Center for Transitional Justice facilitate
an independent legal study on the applicability of the 1948
Genocide Convention to events which occurred during the early
twentieth century. On February 4, 2003, the International Center
for Transitional Justice provided an analysis on the subject. TARC
members will meet soon and resume their work for reconciliation.
* * * * *
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION
AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE TO EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED
DURING THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
LEGAL ANALYSIS PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE
This memorandum was drafted by independent legal counsel
based on a request made to the International Center for Transitional
Justice ("ICTJ"), on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding
("MoU") entered into by The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission
("TARC") on July 12, 2002 and presentations by members of TARC
on September 10, 2002, seeking an objective and independent legal
analysis regarding the applicability of the United Nations ("UN")
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide1
to events which occurred during the early twentieth century.2
This memorandum is a legal, not a factual or historical,
analysis. In deriving the conclusions contained in this memorandum we
have attempted to state explicitly whether our conclusion relies on
any factual assumptions. Although we have reviewed various accounts
of the relevant facts, we have not undertaken any independent factual
investigation.
We emphasize further that this memorandum addresses solely the
applicability of the Genocide Convention to the Events. It does not
purport to address the applicability to the Events of, or the rights
or responsibilities of concerned individuals or entities under,
any other rubric of international law or the laws of any nation.
I. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
A. The International Crime of Genocide
Article I of the Convention declares genocide to be a
crime under international law which signatories will prevent and
punish.3 Article II of the Convention provides that:
[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.4
This Article has been imported verbatim into the
Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, as well as the new Statute of the International
Criminal Court.5
Article III clarifies that complicity in genocide and
conspiracy, direct and public incitement and attempt to commit
genocide, in addition to genocide itself, are punishable.6
B. Punishment of Genocide
Article IV of the Convention states that "[p]ersons
committing genocide ... shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals."7 Articles V, VI and VII impose various obligations
on States party to the Convention to enact domestic measures aimed
at preventing and punishing genocide.8 Articles VIII and IX provide
mechanisms for States party to the Convention to call upon organs of
the UN to take action to prevent and suppress genocide9 and to refer
disputes concerning the "interpretation, application or fulfillment"
of the Convention to the ICJ.10
The remaining nine articles of the Convention are
essentially procedural.11
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
International law generally prohibits the retroactive
application of treaties unless a different intention appears from
the treaty or is otherwise established. The Genocide Convention
contains no provision mandating its retroactive application. To the
contrary, the text of the Convention strongly suggests that it was
intended to impose prospective obligations only on the States party
to it. Therefore, no legal, financial or territorial claim arising
out of the Events could successfully be made against any individual
or state under the Convention.
The term genocide, as used in the Convention to describe the
international crime of that name, may be applied, however, to many
and various events that occurred prior to the entry into force of the
Convention. References to genocide as a historical fact are contained
in the text of the Convention and its travaux preparatoires.
As it has been developed by the International Criminal
Court (whose Statute adopts the Convention's definition of genocide),
the crime of genocide has four elements: (i) the perpetrator killed one
or more persons; (ii) such person or persons belonged to a particular
national, ethnical, racial or religious group; (iii) the perpetrator
intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that group, as such; and
(iv) the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of
similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could
itself effect such destruction.
There are many accounts of the Events, and significant
disagreement among them on many issues of fact. Notwithstanding these
disagreements, the core facts common to all of the various accounts
of the Events we reviewed establish that three of the elements listed
above were met: (1) one or more persons were killed; (2) such persons
belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group;
and (3) the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of
similar conduct directed against that group. For purposes of assessing
whether the Events, viewed collectively, constituted genocide, the only
relevant area of disagreement is on whether the Events were perpetrated
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such. While this legal memorandum is
not intended to definitively resolve particular factual disputes, we
believe that the most reasonable conclusion to draw from the various
accounts of the Events is that at least some of the perpetrators
of the Events knew that the consequence of their actions would be
the destruction, in whole or in part, of the Armenians of eastern
Anatolia, as such, or acted purposively towards this goal, and,
therefore, possessed the requisite genocidal intent. Because the other
three elements identified above have been definitively established,
the Events, viewed collectively, can thus be said to include all of
the elements of the crime of genocide as defined in the Convention,
and legal scholars as well as historians, politicians, journalists
and other people would be justified in continuing to so describe them.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
III. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION DOES NOT BY ITS TERMS APPLY TO ACTS THAT
OCCURRED PRIOR TO JANUARY 12, 1951.
A. International law generally prohibits the retroactive
application of treaties.
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides that:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty
or is otherwise established, its provisions do not
bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took
place or any situation which ceased to exist before
the date of the entry into force of the treaty with
respect to that party.12
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties did
not itself enter into force until January 27, 1980. However, while
the convention "constitute[d] both codification and progressive
development of international law ..."13 at the time it was adopted,
"[m]ost provisions of the Vienna Convention ... are declaratory of
customary international law."14 The International Court of Justice
has noted the customary status of certain provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, including Article 62 (termination
of a treaty by a fundamental change of circumstances)15 and Article 60
(termination of a treaty due to material breach)16. U.S. courts have
applied the interpretive provisions of the convention as reflecting
customary international law (and therefore US law), despite the
fact that the United States has signed but not ratified the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and officials of the U.S. government
have made statements to similar effect.17
The case law of the International Court of Justice
prior to the adoption of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
tends to support the contention that Article 28 codified existing
international law. In the Ambatielos case, the Court observed:
To accept [the Greek Government's] theory would mean
giving retroactive effect to Article 29 of the Treaty
of 1926, whereas Article 32 of this Treaty states
that the Treaty, which must mean all the provisions
of the Treaty, shall come into force immediately
upon ratification. Such a conclusion might have
been rebutted if there had been any special clause
or any special object necessitating retroactive
interpretation. There is no such clause or object
in the present case. It is therefore impossible to
hold that any of its provisions must be deemed to
have been in force earlier.18
The Court in the Ambatielos case recognized that the States Parties
to a treaty could provide for its retroactive application, a position
the Permanent Court of International Justice had earlier upheld.19
The analysis under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties'
formulation of the rule therefore turns to whether "a different
intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established" that
would permit the Genocide Convention to be applied to acts committed
prior to its entry into force.20
B. Neither the text nor the travaux preparatoires of the
Convention manifest an intention to apply its provisions
retroactively.
Pursuant to Article 13, the Convention entered into
force on January 12, 1951, the ninetieth day following the date
of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification with the UN
Secretary-General. Subsequent ratifications and accessions became
effective for the states submitting them on the ninetieth day following
the date of their deposit. As noted above, unless a contrary intention
appears, a treaty provision stating that a treaty comes into force
on a particular date "must mean all the provisions of the Treaty"
come into force on that date.21
The text of those provisions of the Convention imposing
obligations on States Parties to the Convention almost universally
obligate the States Parties to take action in the future. For example,
the States Parties "undertake" to prevent and punish the crime of
genocide,22 "undertake to enact" the necessary legislation to give
effect to the Convention's provisions,23 and agree that persons
charged with genocide "shall be tried" by competent domestic or
international tribunals24.
The travaux preparatoires of the Convention support
the contention that the negotiators understood that they were accepting
prospective, not retrospective, obligations on behalf of the States
they represented, including the "prevention of future crimes."25
One delegate described the purpose of the Convention as expressing
"the peoples' desire to punish all those who, in the future, might
be tempted to repeat the appalling crimes that had been committed."26
C. Conclusion
The Genocide Convention does not give rise to
individual criminal or state responsibility for events which occurred
during the early twentieth century or at any time prior to January
12, 1951.
IV. ALTHOUGH THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO STATE OR
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED PRIOR TO JANUARY
12, 1951, THE TERM "GENOCIDE", AS DEFINED IN THE CONVENTION,
MAY BE APPLIED TO DESCRIBE SUCH EVENTS.
A. Scope of this memorandum
We have been requested to provide our opinion on the
"applicability" of the Genocide Convention to the Events. It is beyond
the scope of this memorandum to investigate the extent to which the
Convention codified existing international law regarding responsibility
for genocidal acts, although we note that the International Court
of Justice has opined that, at least following its adoption, the
"principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
conventional obligation."27 Likewise, this memorandum does not address,
as beyond the scope of the request to us, the claim raised as early as
191528 that the Events constituted, when committed, an international
crime entailing state and individual criminal responsibility under
customary international law.
The request to consider the "applicability" of the
Convention to the Events does encompass an analysis of whether the
term "genocide", as defined in the Convention, may appropriately be
applied, (a) as a general matter, to describe events which occurred
in the early twentieth century and (b) to describe the Events.
B. Terminological applicability of the term "genocide"
to events which occurred during the early twentieth century.
It is clear, from the text of the Convention and
related documents and the travaux preparatoires, that the term genocide
may be applied to events that pre-dated the adoption of the Convention.
The drafters of the Genocide Convention used the term
"genocide" to refer to events that pre-dated the adoption of the
Convention. Although Rafael Lemkin did not coin the term "genocide"
until 1943, the text of the Convention and other writings conclusively
establish that he and the other drafters of the Convention understood
and used the word genocide to describe acts perpetrated prior to
the Convention's adoption.29 The States Parties to the Convention
recognize, in the Convention's preamble, that "at all periods of
history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity."30
The travaux preparatoires contain numerous references
to genocide as a historical fact. The Cuban delegate stated that
"[h]istory revealed innumerable examples of genocide ..."31, while the
Egyptian delegate, in arguing against a direct link between genocide
and fascism-nazism, spoke of "instances of genocide [which] were to be
found in the far more distant past."32 The British delegate, who had
been the chief British prosecutor before the Nuremberg Tribunal, spoke
of genocide as "a crime already known in international law, of which
history had furnished many examples throughout the centuries."33 The
Argentinean delegate referred to genocide as "a crime which, although
it had always been known to exist, had only recently been defined."34
Likewise, Resolution 96(I) of the United Nations
General Assembly, which was passed unanimously and authorized the
drafting of the Convention, refers to "many instances of such crimes
of genocide" which "have occurred when racial, religious, and other
groups have been destroyed, entirely, or in part."35
It is clear from the travaux preparatoires that
the Committee negotiating the final text considered and rejected
text that would have tied the concept of genocide more closely to
the actions and motivations of the Nazis,36 on the grounds that the
Holocaust was not the first or only instance of genocide in human
history.37
C. Applicability of the term "genocide" to the Events.
1. Elements of the Crime of Genocide
While it is not seriously disputed that massacres,
deportations and other crimes were committed against Armenian citizens
of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, there is
disagreement on certain facts, including the number of people affected
and, crucially, the identity and intent of the perpetrators. 38
As a legal matter, to convict a person of the crime
of genocide one must establish certain essential elements. In
connection with the establishment of the International Criminal Court,
the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court has
developed an enumeration of four such essential elements, the proof
of which would result in a determination that the events in question
constituted genocide as defined in ICC Statute (which, as noted above,
mirrors the text of the Genocide Convention).39 The four elements of
the crime of "genocide by killing" are:
(i) the perpetrator killed (or caused the
death of) one or more persons;
(ii) such person or persons belonged to
a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious
group;
(iii) the perpetrator intended to destroy,
in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such; and
(iv) the conduct took place in the context
of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed
against that group or was conduct that could itself
effect such destruction.40
It is important to note that these elements were
developed in order to assess the guilt or innocence of individuals
alleged to have perpetrated genocide, a task which is well beyond the
scope of this memorandum. We have been asked to analyze whether the
Convention is applicable to the Events, collectively. This memorandum
therefore proceeds to analyze whether the Events constituted genocide
as defined in the Convention, using the elements of the crime of
genocide outlined above as an analytical tool for this purpose.
2. The Events as genocide within the meaning of
the Convention.
There are many and various accounts of the Events,
including contemporary newspaper reports,41 the memoirs of Ottoman42
and foreign43 officials and Armenian survivors,44 reports of judicial
decisions,45 correspondence and other documents contained in government
archives46 and the work of eminent historians, beginning with Arnold
Toynbee.47 The core facts common to all of the various accounts of
the facts we have reviewed in the course of preparing this memorandum
establish that, in viewing the Events collectively, at least three
of the four elements of the crime of genocide identified in Section
II.C.1 of this memorandum occurred during the Events. First, one
or more persons were killed. Second, such persons belonged to a
particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Finally,
the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar
conduct directed against that group.
While the accounts we have reviewed reveal some
disagreement on the intent or motives that animated the perpetrators
of the Events, the overwhelming majority of the accounts conclude
that the Events occurred with some level of intent to effect the
destruction of the Armenian communities in the eastern provinces of
the Ottoman Empire, with many claiming that this was the specific
intent of the most senior government officials.48
The Turkish government maintains that no direct
evidence has been presented demonstrating that any Ottoman official
sought the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians.49 In light of the
frequent references to the participation of Ottoman officials in the
Events, we wish to highlight that a finding of genocide does not
as a legal matter depend on the participation of state actors. On
the contrary, the Genocide Convention confirms that perpetrators
of genocide will be punished whether they are "constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals."50 Thus,
it is legally appropriate to maintain that the Events constituted
genocide as defined in the Convention on the basis of a conclusion
that they were perpetrated with the intent of permanently resolving
the "Armenian question", whether or not this was the official state
policy of the Ottoman Empire.
This memorandum sets forth below certain relevant
legal considerations that bear on the resolution of the crucial issue
of genocidal intent.
3. Genocidal Intent.
On its face, the Genocide Convention's reference to
"intent" sets it apart from other crimes under international
law. The ICTR and ICTY Statutes define crimes against humanity, for
instance, by referring to acts "committed as part of a widespread
and systematic attack" against certain civilian populations.51
Although it is understood that the actor must engage purposively in
the prohibited conduct (such as killing or causing serious harm),
there is no explicit reference to the actor's intent with respect to
the widespread, systematic character of the attacks.
Genocide, by contrast, requires, at the very least,
an awareness on the part of the actor of the discriminatory nature of
his actions. While murder in the context of a widespread and systematic
attack may constitute a crime against humanity, it cannot meet the
legal definition of genocide absent evidence of the perpetrator's
intent to kill with the effect of destroying, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. The scope and
level of the requisite intent, however, involve complex and evolving
issues of international law.52
The travaux preparatoires report debate on the question
of the scope and level of intent required to commit genocide.53
The adoption of the words "as such" after the enumeration of
protected groups represented a compromise designed to satisfy
both the delegates who favored inclusion of a motive and those
who thought it counterproductive. 54 Given this context, the "as
such" language is susceptible of both a general and a stricter,
motive-based, interpretation. As the delegate from Siam noted,
"there were two possible interpretations of the words 'as such';
they might mean 'in that the group is a national, racial, religious,
or political group', or 'because the group is a national, racial,
religious or political group.'"55
The judges of the ICTR and ICTY have, on several
occasions, been called upon to consider genocidal intent.56 The
decisions thus far have held that a genocide conviction requires
a showing of a particular intent. The judgments have referred
to this intent variously as specific intent, genocidal intent,
or dolus specialis.57 These terms have somewhat divergent meaning
in domestic jurisprudence and these decisions have not always been
internally consistent in their discussions of intent. Moreover, the
decisions have essentially been silent on whether a perpetrator must
consciously desire destruction of the group, or whether knowledge
that such destruction may ensue in the course of his actions will be
sufficient.58 We note further that the discussion of the appropriate
legal standard for intent is inherently fact-specific and, in light
of the factual disputes on this point, we do not express an opinion on
the standard that might be applied in any particular determination of
whether the Events constituted genocide as defined in the Convention.
D. Conclusion
The crucial issue of genocidal intent is contested,
and this legal memorandum is not intended to definitively resolve
particular factual disputes. Nonetheless, we believe that the most
reasonable conclusion to draw from the various accounts referred to
above of the Events is that, notwithstanding the efforts of large
numbers of "righteous Turks"59 who intervened on behalf of the
Armenians, at least some of the perpetrators of the Events knew
that the consequence of their actions would be the destruction,
in whole or in part, of the Armenians of eastern Anatolia, as such,
or acted purposively towards this goal, and, therefore, possessed
the requisite genocidal intent. Because the other three elements
identified above have been definitively established, the Events,
viewed collectively, can thus be said to include all of the elements
of the crime of genocide as defined in the Convention, and legal
scholars as well as historians, politicians, journalists and other
people would be justified in continuing to so describe them.
*****
FOOTNOTES:
1 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, U.N.G.A. Res. 260,
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 179th Plen. Mtg. at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) [hereinafter "Genocide Convention" or the "Convention"].
2 We acknowledge disagreement as to the magnitude and scope
of these events, their context and intended effect, and the
identities and affiliations of their perpetrators. See, e.g.,
on the one hand, Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ten Questions, Ten
Answers: Did 1.5 Million Armenians Die During World War I?,
available at http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/
documents/10Q10A.pdf/; and, on the other hand,
Armenian National Institute, Genocide FAQ, available at
http://www.armenian-genocide.org/genocidefaq.htm#HowMany. This
memorandum adopts the terminology of TARC reflected in the MoU in
referring to these events hereinafter as the "Events."
3 Genocide Convention, Art. I.
4 Id., Art. II.
5 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighboring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d Mtg. at 3.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, Annex (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1602
(1994) [hereinafter "ICTR Statute"]; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704,
Annex, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1994) [hereinafter "ICTY
Statute"]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9
(1958), available at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm [hereinafter
"ICC Statute"].
6 Genocide Convention, Art. III. The Convention refers in several
instances to "genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article
III" (or words to that effect). See id., Arts. IV, V, VI, VII, VIII
and IX. For purposes of convenience, references in this memorandum
to the international crime of "genocide" are intended, unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise, to encompass genocide and the
other acts enumerated in article III of the Genocide Convention.
7 Id., Art. IV. While Article IV provides only that "persons"
(rather than states) shall be punished for committing genocide,
Article IX of the Convention provides that disputes between states
party to the Genocide Convention relating to its interpretation,
application or fulfillment, "including those relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide," shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") at the request of any of the
parties to the dispute. Id., Art. IX. The ICJ has stated that the
reference in Article IV of the Convention to "rulers" or "public
officials" "does not exclude any form of State responsibility …
for acts of its organs" and that Article IX's reference to State
responsibility may include responsibility for the commission of
genocide, as well as responsibility for failure to fulfill the
State's obligations to prevent and punish genocide as set forth in
Articles V, VI and VII. See Int'l Ct. of Justice, Case Concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary
Objections (July 11, 1996), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyjudgment/ibhy_ijudgment_19960711_frame.htm,
¶ 32.
8 Genocide Convention, Arts. V-VII.
9 Id., Art. VIII.
10 Id., Art. IX.
11 Id., Arts. X-XIX
12 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), Art. 28 [hereinafter "Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties"].
13 International Law Commission, Reports of the Commission to
the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 169, 177,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.
14 Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States relating
to International Law, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 142, 147 (1981)(quoting
text of a letter dated Sept. 12, 1980 from Roberts B. Owen, Legal
Adviser of the U.S. Dep't of State, to Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation).
15 "This principle, and the conditions and exceptions to which it is
subject, have been embodied in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which may in many respects be considered
as a codification of existing customary law on the subject of
the termination of a treaty relationship on account of change
of circumstances." Int'l Ct. of Justice, Fisheries Jurisdiction
(U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, 1973 I.C.J. 3, 8
(Feb. 2).
16 "The rules laid down by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
concerning termination of a treaty relationship on account of
breach (adopted without a dissenting vote) may in many respects
be considered as a codification of existing customary law on the
subject." Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970 I.C.J. 6, (Jun. 21).
17 See generally Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law III,
Introductory Note (1987).
18 Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 1952
I.C.J. 27, 40 (July 1).
19 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, 1924 PCIJ (Ser. A.) No. 2
("An essential characteristic therefore of Protocol XII [is]
that its effects extend to legal situations dating from a time
previous to its own existence. If provision were not made in the
clauses or the Protocol for the protection of the rights recognized
therein as against infringements before the coming into force
of that instrument, the Protocol would be ineffective as regards
the very period at which the rights in question are most in need
of protection.").
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 28.
21 Ambatielos Case, supra note 18. See also Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law § 322 (1987).
22 Genocide Convention, Art. 1.
23 Id., Art. 5.
24 Id., Art. 6.
25 Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part
I, Sixth Committee, p. 13 (Statement of Mr. Morozov) [hereinafter
"Travaux Preparatoires"]. See also id. pp. 41- 42 (statement of
Mr. Dihigo), p.44 (statement of Mr. Kaeckenbeeck).
26 Travaux Preparatoires, p. 30 (statement of Mr. Prochazka). See
also id. p. 15 (Statement of Mr. Sundaram) ("genocide should be made
a punishable crime"), p. 78 (Statement of Mr. Maûrtua)("the concept
of genocide was new"), p. 126 (Statement of Mr. Messina)(genocide
was "a new crime under international law"), p. 127 (Statement of
Mr. Fitzmaurice)("the aim of the convention was to establish the
concept of a new crime").
27 Int'l Ct. of Justice, Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion
(May 28, 1951), 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23. The ICJ recently confirmed that
"the rights and obligations enshrined by the [Genocide] Convention
are rights and obligations erga omnes." Int'l Ct. of Justice,
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (July 11, 1996), 1996
I.C.J. 595, 616.
28 On May 24, 1915 the Allies issued a joint declaration that "[i]n
view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and
civilization, the Allied governments announce publicly ... that they
will hold personally responsible ... all members of the Ottoman
government and those of their agents who are implicated in such
massacres [of Armenians]." See Matthew Lippman, The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty
Years Later, 15 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 415, 416 (1998). The 1919
Report of the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the
War and on Enforcement of Penalties concluded that the Ottoman
Empire's treatment of Armenians in its territory contravened
"the established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws
of humanity," and declared that Ottoman officials accused of such
acts were liable for prosecution. Commission on the Responsibility
of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties,
Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29,
1919, reprinted in 14 Am. J. Int'l L. 95, 112-17 (1920). The
two U.S. delegates dissented, objecting most strenuously to the
criminalization of contraventions of the laws of humanity. The
laws of humanity were, they believed, a moral rather than a legal
concept, and they felt that the prosecution of individuals before a
newly created international court for violation of the ill-defined
laws of humanity would constitute retroactive prosecution. Id.,
at 134-36.
29 Lemkin uses the term to refer, among other things, to "classical
examples of wars of extermination in which nations and groups of the
population were completely or almost completely destroyed." Examples
cited include the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C.; the
destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in 72 A.D.; the religious wars
of Islam and the Crusades; the massacres of the Albigenses and
the Wladenses; and the siege of Magdeburg in the Thirty Years'
War. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe 80 at n. 3 (1944).
30 Genocide Convention, preamble.
31 Travaux Preparatoires, p. 23 (Statement of Mr. Blanco).
32 Id., p. 500. (Statement of Mr. Raafat).
33 Id., p. 40 (Statement of Sir Hartley Shawcross).
34 Id., p. 28 (Statement of Mr. Bustos Fierro).
35 G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946)
(emphasis added).
36 See Travaux Preparatoires, at p. 9 (Statement of Mr. Bartos), 19
(Statement of Mr. Lachs), id., p. 30 (Statement of Mr. Prochazka)
(referring to the relationship between genocide and the doctrines of
Nazism, fascism and Japanese imperialism); id., p. 501 (Statement
of Mr. Chaumont ("the convention would never have been drafted
if it had not been for the crimes committed under the Nazi and
fascist regimes").
37 See Travaux Preparatoires, p. 17 (Statement of Mr. Manini y
Ríos)("it was generally known that the nazi and fascist parties
went to extremes of genocidal crime, but ... there was no need
to include [an explicit] qualification [to that effect] in the
convention"), p. 24 (Statement of Mr. Tsien Tai), pp. 489-509,
passim. It is clear that Lemkin's awareness of and research into
the Events also had an important role in animating his advocacy
for the adoption of the Convention. See Samantha Power, "A Problem
from Hell:" America and the Age of Genocide 17-20 (2002).
38 Supra note 2.
39 Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, Report of the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
Addendum, Part II, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000), at 6
[hereinafter "Elements of Crimes"]. The analysis set forth herein
is limited to the crime of "genocide by killing." In analyzing
whether the Events constituted genocide by other means (e.g.,
"genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm" or "genocide
by deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring
about physical destruction"), one or more additional elements
might have to be proved. Id., at 6-8.
40 Id., at 6.
41 For example, The New York Times printed numerous articles relating
to the Events, which are collected and reprinted in Richard
D. Kloian, The Armenian Genocide: News Accounts from the American
Press, 1915-1922 (3d ed. 2000).
42 See, e.g., Armenian Rebellions and Massacres: Veteran and
Eyewitness Accounts in Armenian Issue: Allegations-Facts, available
at http://www.kultur.gov.tr/portal/tarih_en.asp?belgeno=159.
43 See, e.g., Armin T. Wegner, Armin T. Wegner and the Armenians in
Anatolia, 1915: Images and Testimonies (1996); Stanley Kerr, Lions
of Marash: Personal Experiences with American Near East Relief
(1973); Henry H. Riggs, Days of Tragedy in Armenia: Personal
Experiences in Harpoot, 1915-1917 (1997); Leslie A. Davis, The
Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat's Report on the
Armenian Genocide of 1915-1917 (1988), Viscount James Bryce and
Arnold J. Toynbee (eds.), The Treatment of the Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire, 1915- 1916 (2d ed. 1972). Often cited as well
are the accounts of Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to
Turkey from 1913 to 1916, who was reported to have frequently and
persitently intervened on behalf of the Armenians with Turkish
officials and was instrumental in bringing international attention
to the Events. See, e.g., Morgenthau Intercedes, N.Y. Times,
April 29, 1915, reprinted in Kloian, supra note 41, at 10; Laud
Our Ambassador, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1915, reprinted in Kloian,
supra note 41, at 29. Morgenthau included his account of what he
termed "the murder of a nation" in his memoirs, published in 1918.
Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (1918), at 301
et seq.
44 See, e.g., Abraham Hartunian, Neither to Laugh nor to Weep:
A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide (2d ed. 1986); John Minassian,
Many Hills Yet to Climb: Memoirs of an Armenian Deportee (1986);
Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, Survivors: An Oral
History of the Armenian Genocide (1993).
45 See, e.g., Vahakn Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and
International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and its
Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 Yale. J. Int'l L. 221,
291-315 (1989).
46 For example, documents in the U.S. archives are available in
the National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group
59, Decimal Files 867 and 860J. U.K. archives are available in
the Public Record Office, Foreign Office Records, Class 371. The
Republic of Turkey indicates that the Turkish archives, maintained
at the Prime Minstry's State Archives, are open and available
to all. See Important Questions And Answers: Is There Access
to the Ottoman Archives? Are Documents Related [to] Relocation
Concealed? in Armenian Issue: Allegations-Facts, available at
http://www.kultur.gov.tr/portal/tarih_en.asp?belgeno=253.
47 Supra note 43.
48 See e.g, Morgenthau, supra note 43; Descendants of Survivors of
the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust, 126 Holocaust Scholars
Affirm the Incontestable Fact of the Armenian Genocide and Urge
Western Democracies to Officially Recognize It, N.Y. Times,
June 9, 2000, at A29 (reproducing a statement "affirming that
the World War I Armenian Genocide is an incontestable historical
fact"). We note that many Turkish accounts dispute the objectivity
and authenticity of these accounts and, in particular, insist
that the deportations consisted of preventive measures to
relocate certain Armenians who posed a threat, and that most
of the killings were the result of inevitable casualties of the
war and of banditry (in other words, the Events were animated by
political and security-related motives or with ordinary criminal
intent, and not with genocidal intent). See, e.g., Ysmet Bynark,
Foreword, in Selected Books: Armenians in Ottoman Turkey (Oct. 30,
1995), available at http:www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eg/eg11/02.htm;
Relocation: Attacks on Armenian Convoys and Measures Taken by
the Government, in Armenian Issue: Allegations-Facts, available
at http://www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr/english/relocation/measures.html.
49 See Armenian Allegations of Genocide: The Issue and the Facts, at
http://www.turkishembassy.org/governmentpolitics/issuesarmenian.htm/.
50 Genocide Convention, Art. IV.
51 ICTR Statute, supra note 5, Art. 3; ICTY Statute, supra note 5, Art. 4.
52 See Payam Akhavan, Contributions of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to Developments of
Definitions of Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide, 94 Am. Soc'y
Int'l L. Proc. 279, 282 (2000); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt,
Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based
Interpretation, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2259, 2278 (1999).
53 Travaux Preparatoires, pp. 117-139. The term dolus specialis was
used to connote this particular intent. It was repeatedly argued
that what distinguished genocide from murder was the particular
intent to destroy a group; as the Brazilian delegate pointed out,
"genocide [is] characterized by the factor of particular intent
to destroy a group. In the absence of that factor, whatever the
degree of atrocity of an act and however similar it might be to
the acts described in the convention, that act could still not be
called genocide." Id., pp. 81-89.
54 Travaux Preparatoires, pp. 129-139. See also Greenawalt, supra
note 52, at 2278.
55 Travaux Preparatoires, p. 133. The protected groups identified by
the Siamese delegate later changed.
56 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber 1, Sept. 2,
1998), available at http://www.ictr.org/; Prosecutor v. Clément
Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 1999
WL 33288417 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber II, May 21,
1999); Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-IA-T,
Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber 1, June 7, 2001),
available at http://www.ictr.org; Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic,
Case No. ICTY-95-10-A, Appeals Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, July 5, 2001), available at
www.un.org/icty/brcko/appeal/judgment/index.htm; Prosecutor v.
Sikirica, Case No. ICTY-95-8-T, Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber III, September 3, 2001), available at
www.un.org/icty/sikirica/judgment/indexe.htm; Prosecutor v. Krstic,
Case No. ICTY-98-33, Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber 1, Aug. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/judgment/index.htm.
57 In a 300-page judgment issued on September 2, 1998, the Trial
Chamber of the ICTR found a former Rwandan mayor, Jean Paul Akayesu,
guilty of various charges of genocide and crimes against humanity,
the first genocide conviction since Nuremberg. Regarding the germane
issue of criminal intent, the Trial Chamber said "[g]enocide is
distinct from other crimes inasmuch as it embodies a special intent
or dolus specialis. Special intent of a crime is the specific
intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which
demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act
charged. Thus, the special intent in the crime of genocide lies in
'the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such." Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul
Akayesu, supra note 56, ¶ 498.
58 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, supra note 56, ¶ 571.
59 Paul Glastris, Armenia's History, Turkey's Dilemma,
Wash. Post, March 11, 2001, at B01; Zoryan Institute, Turks
Who Saved Armenians: An Introduction (rev. ed.), available at
http://www.zoryaninstitute.org/Table_Of_Contents/genocide_docs_turksintro.htm.
Armenian News Network / Groong
February 10, 2003
TURKISH-ARMENIAN RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TARC) STATEMENT
The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) requested
that the International Center for Transitional Justice facilitate
an independent legal study on the applicability of the 1948
Genocide Convention to events which occurred during the early
twentieth century. On February 4, 2003, the International Center
for Transitional Justice provided an analysis on the subject. TARC
members will meet soon and resume their work for reconciliation.
* * * * *
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION
AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE TO EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED
DURING THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
LEGAL ANALYSIS PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE
This memorandum was drafted by independent legal counsel
based on a request made to the International Center for Transitional
Justice ("ICTJ"), on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding
("MoU") entered into by The Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission
("TARC") on July 12, 2002 and presentations by members of TARC
on September 10, 2002, seeking an objective and independent legal
analysis regarding the applicability of the United Nations ("UN")
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide1
to events which occurred during the early twentieth century.2
This memorandum is a legal, not a factual or historical,
analysis. In deriving the conclusions contained in this memorandum we
have attempted to state explicitly whether our conclusion relies on
any factual assumptions. Although we have reviewed various accounts
of the relevant facts, we have not undertaken any independent factual
investigation.
We emphasize further that this memorandum addresses solely the
applicability of the Genocide Convention to the Events. It does not
purport to address the applicability to the Events of, or the rights
or responsibilities of concerned individuals or entities under,
any other rubric of international law or the laws of any nation.
I. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
A. The International Crime of Genocide
Article I of the Convention declares genocide to be a
crime under international law which signatories will prevent and
punish.3 Article II of the Convention provides that:
[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.4
This Article has been imported verbatim into the
Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, as well as the new Statute of the International
Criminal Court.5
Article III clarifies that complicity in genocide and
conspiracy, direct and public incitement and attempt to commit
genocide, in addition to genocide itself, are punishable.6
B. Punishment of Genocide
Article IV of the Convention states that "[p]ersons
committing genocide ... shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals."7 Articles V, VI and VII impose various obligations
on States party to the Convention to enact domestic measures aimed
at preventing and punishing genocide.8 Articles VIII and IX provide
mechanisms for States party to the Convention to call upon organs of
the UN to take action to prevent and suppress genocide9 and to refer
disputes concerning the "interpretation, application or fulfillment"
of the Convention to the ICJ.10
The remaining nine articles of the Convention are
essentially procedural.11
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
International law generally prohibits the retroactive
application of treaties unless a different intention appears from
the treaty or is otherwise established. The Genocide Convention
contains no provision mandating its retroactive application. To the
contrary, the text of the Convention strongly suggests that it was
intended to impose prospective obligations only on the States party
to it. Therefore, no legal, financial or territorial claim arising
out of the Events could successfully be made against any individual
or state under the Convention.
The term genocide, as used in the Convention to describe the
international crime of that name, may be applied, however, to many
and various events that occurred prior to the entry into force of the
Convention. References to genocide as a historical fact are contained
in the text of the Convention and its travaux preparatoires.
As it has been developed by the International Criminal
Court (whose Statute adopts the Convention's definition of genocide),
the crime of genocide has four elements: (i) the perpetrator killed one
or more persons; (ii) such person or persons belonged to a particular
national, ethnical, racial or religious group; (iii) the perpetrator
intended to destroy, in whole or in part, that group, as such; and
(iv) the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of
similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could
itself effect such destruction.
There are many accounts of the Events, and significant
disagreement among them on many issues of fact. Notwithstanding these
disagreements, the core facts common to all of the various accounts
of the Events we reviewed establish that three of the elements listed
above were met: (1) one or more persons were killed; (2) such persons
belonged to a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group;
and (3) the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of
similar conduct directed against that group. For purposes of assessing
whether the Events, viewed collectively, constituted genocide, the only
relevant area of disagreement is on whether the Events were perpetrated
with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such. While this legal memorandum is
not intended to definitively resolve particular factual disputes, we
believe that the most reasonable conclusion to draw from the various
accounts of the Events is that at least some of the perpetrators
of the Events knew that the consequence of their actions would be
the destruction, in whole or in part, of the Armenians of eastern
Anatolia, as such, or acted purposively towards this goal, and,
therefore, possessed the requisite genocidal intent. Because the other
three elements identified above have been definitively established,
the Events, viewed collectively, can thus be said to include all of
the elements of the crime of genocide as defined in the Convention,
and legal scholars as well as historians, politicians, journalists
and other people would be justified in continuing to so describe them.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
III. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION DOES NOT BY ITS TERMS APPLY TO ACTS THAT
OCCURRED PRIOR TO JANUARY 12, 1951.
A. International law generally prohibits the retroactive
application of treaties.
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides that:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty
or is otherwise established, its provisions do not
bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took
place or any situation which ceased to exist before
the date of the entry into force of the treaty with
respect to that party.12
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties did
not itself enter into force until January 27, 1980. However, while
the convention "constitute[d] both codification and progressive
development of international law ..."13 at the time it was adopted,
"[m]ost provisions of the Vienna Convention ... are declaratory of
customary international law."14 The International Court of Justice
has noted the customary status of certain provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, including Article 62 (termination
of a treaty by a fundamental change of circumstances)15 and Article 60
(termination of a treaty due to material breach)16. U.S. courts have
applied the interpretive provisions of the convention as reflecting
customary international law (and therefore US law), despite the
fact that the United States has signed but not ratified the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and officials of the U.S. government
have made statements to similar effect.17
The case law of the International Court of Justice
prior to the adoption of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
tends to support the contention that Article 28 codified existing
international law. In the Ambatielos case, the Court observed:
To accept [the Greek Government's] theory would mean
giving retroactive effect to Article 29 of the Treaty
of 1926, whereas Article 32 of this Treaty states
that the Treaty, which must mean all the provisions
of the Treaty, shall come into force immediately
upon ratification. Such a conclusion might have
been rebutted if there had been any special clause
or any special object necessitating retroactive
interpretation. There is no such clause or object
in the present case. It is therefore impossible to
hold that any of its provisions must be deemed to
have been in force earlier.18
The Court in the Ambatielos case recognized that the States Parties
to a treaty could provide for its retroactive application, a position
the Permanent Court of International Justice had earlier upheld.19
The analysis under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties'
formulation of the rule therefore turns to whether "a different
intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established" that
would permit the Genocide Convention to be applied to acts committed
prior to its entry into force.20
B. Neither the text nor the travaux preparatoires of the
Convention manifest an intention to apply its provisions
retroactively.
Pursuant to Article 13, the Convention entered into
force on January 12, 1951, the ninetieth day following the date
of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification with the UN
Secretary-General. Subsequent ratifications and accessions became
effective for the states submitting them on the ninetieth day following
the date of their deposit. As noted above, unless a contrary intention
appears, a treaty provision stating that a treaty comes into force
on a particular date "must mean all the provisions of the Treaty"
come into force on that date.21
The text of those provisions of the Convention imposing
obligations on States Parties to the Convention almost universally
obligate the States Parties to take action in the future. For example,
the States Parties "undertake" to prevent and punish the crime of
genocide,22 "undertake to enact" the necessary legislation to give
effect to the Convention's provisions,23 and agree that persons
charged with genocide "shall be tried" by competent domestic or
international tribunals24.
The travaux preparatoires of the Convention support
the contention that the negotiators understood that they were accepting
prospective, not retrospective, obligations on behalf of the States
they represented, including the "prevention of future crimes."25
One delegate described the purpose of the Convention as expressing
"the peoples' desire to punish all those who, in the future, might
be tempted to repeat the appalling crimes that had been committed."26
C. Conclusion
The Genocide Convention does not give rise to
individual criminal or state responsibility for events which occurred
during the early twentieth century or at any time prior to January
12, 1951.
IV. ALTHOUGH THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO STATE OR
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR EVENTS WHICH OCCURRED PRIOR TO JANUARY
12, 1951, THE TERM "GENOCIDE", AS DEFINED IN THE CONVENTION,
MAY BE APPLIED TO DESCRIBE SUCH EVENTS.
A. Scope of this memorandum
We have been requested to provide our opinion on the
"applicability" of the Genocide Convention to the Events. It is beyond
the scope of this memorandum to investigate the extent to which the
Convention codified existing international law regarding responsibility
for genocidal acts, although we note that the International Court
of Justice has opined that, at least following its adoption, the
"principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
conventional obligation."27 Likewise, this memorandum does not address,
as beyond the scope of the request to us, the claim raised as early as
191528 that the Events constituted, when committed, an international
crime entailing state and individual criminal responsibility under
customary international law.
The request to consider the "applicability" of the
Convention to the Events does encompass an analysis of whether the
term "genocide", as defined in the Convention, may appropriately be
applied, (a) as a general matter, to describe events which occurred
in the early twentieth century and (b) to describe the Events.
B. Terminological applicability of the term "genocide"
to events which occurred during the early twentieth century.
It is clear, from the text of the Convention and
related documents and the travaux preparatoires, that the term genocide
may be applied to events that pre-dated the adoption of the Convention.
The drafters of the Genocide Convention used the term
"genocide" to refer to events that pre-dated the adoption of the
Convention. Although Rafael Lemkin did not coin the term "genocide"
until 1943, the text of the Convention and other writings conclusively
establish that he and the other drafters of the Convention understood
and used the word genocide to describe acts perpetrated prior to
the Convention's adoption.29 The States Parties to the Convention
recognize, in the Convention's preamble, that "at all periods of
history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity."30
The travaux preparatoires contain numerous references
to genocide as a historical fact. The Cuban delegate stated that
"[h]istory revealed innumerable examples of genocide ..."31, while the
Egyptian delegate, in arguing against a direct link between genocide
and fascism-nazism, spoke of "instances of genocide [which] were to be
found in the far more distant past."32 The British delegate, who had
been the chief British prosecutor before the Nuremberg Tribunal, spoke
of genocide as "a crime already known in international law, of which
history had furnished many examples throughout the centuries."33 The
Argentinean delegate referred to genocide as "a crime which, although
it had always been known to exist, had only recently been defined."34
Likewise, Resolution 96(I) of the United Nations
General Assembly, which was passed unanimously and authorized the
drafting of the Convention, refers to "many instances of such crimes
of genocide" which "have occurred when racial, religious, and other
groups have been destroyed, entirely, or in part."35
It is clear from the travaux preparatoires that
the Committee negotiating the final text considered and rejected
text that would have tied the concept of genocide more closely to
the actions and motivations of the Nazis,36 on the grounds that the
Holocaust was not the first or only instance of genocide in human
history.37
C. Applicability of the term "genocide" to the Events.
1. Elements of the Crime of Genocide
While it is not seriously disputed that massacres,
deportations and other crimes were committed against Armenian citizens
of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, there is
disagreement on certain facts, including the number of people affected
and, crucially, the identity and intent of the perpetrators. 38
As a legal matter, to convict a person of the crime
of genocide one must establish certain essential elements. In
connection with the establishment of the International Criminal Court,
the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court has
developed an enumeration of four such essential elements, the proof
of which would result in a determination that the events in question
constituted genocide as defined in ICC Statute (which, as noted above,
mirrors the text of the Genocide Convention).39 The four elements of
the crime of "genocide by killing" are:
(i) the perpetrator killed (or caused the
death of) one or more persons;
(ii) such person or persons belonged to
a particular national, ethnical, racial or religious
group;
(iii) the perpetrator intended to destroy,
in whole or in part, that national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such; and
(iv) the conduct took place in the context
of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed
against that group or was conduct that could itself
effect such destruction.40
It is important to note that these elements were
developed in order to assess the guilt or innocence of individuals
alleged to have perpetrated genocide, a task which is well beyond the
scope of this memorandum. We have been asked to analyze whether the
Convention is applicable to the Events, collectively. This memorandum
therefore proceeds to analyze whether the Events constituted genocide
as defined in the Convention, using the elements of the crime of
genocide outlined above as an analytical tool for this purpose.
2. The Events as genocide within the meaning of
the Convention.
There are many and various accounts of the Events,
including contemporary newspaper reports,41 the memoirs of Ottoman42
and foreign43 officials and Armenian survivors,44 reports of judicial
decisions,45 correspondence and other documents contained in government
archives46 and the work of eminent historians, beginning with Arnold
Toynbee.47 The core facts common to all of the various accounts of
the facts we have reviewed in the course of preparing this memorandum
establish that, in viewing the Events collectively, at least three
of the four elements of the crime of genocide identified in Section
II.C.1 of this memorandum occurred during the Events. First, one
or more persons were killed. Second, such persons belonged to a
particular national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Finally,
the conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar
conduct directed against that group.
While the accounts we have reviewed reveal some
disagreement on the intent or motives that animated the perpetrators
of the Events, the overwhelming majority of the accounts conclude
that the Events occurred with some level of intent to effect the
destruction of the Armenian communities in the eastern provinces of
the Ottoman Empire, with many claiming that this was the specific
intent of the most senior government officials.48
The Turkish government maintains that no direct
evidence has been presented demonstrating that any Ottoman official
sought the destruction of the Ottoman Armenians.49 In light of the
frequent references to the participation of Ottoman officials in the
Events, we wish to highlight that a finding of genocide does not
as a legal matter depend on the participation of state actors. On
the contrary, the Genocide Convention confirms that perpetrators
of genocide will be punished whether they are "constitutionally
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals."50 Thus,
it is legally appropriate to maintain that the Events constituted
genocide as defined in the Convention on the basis of a conclusion
that they were perpetrated with the intent of permanently resolving
the "Armenian question", whether or not this was the official state
policy of the Ottoman Empire.
This memorandum sets forth below certain relevant
legal considerations that bear on the resolution of the crucial issue
of genocidal intent.
3. Genocidal Intent.
On its face, the Genocide Convention's reference to
"intent" sets it apart from other crimes under international
law. The ICTR and ICTY Statutes define crimes against humanity, for
instance, by referring to acts "committed as part of a widespread
and systematic attack" against certain civilian populations.51
Although it is understood that the actor must engage purposively in
the prohibited conduct (such as killing or causing serious harm),
there is no explicit reference to the actor's intent with respect to
the widespread, systematic character of the attacks.
Genocide, by contrast, requires, at the very least,
an awareness on the part of the actor of the discriminatory nature of
his actions. While murder in the context of a widespread and systematic
attack may constitute a crime against humanity, it cannot meet the
legal definition of genocide absent evidence of the perpetrator's
intent to kill with the effect of destroying, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. The scope and
level of the requisite intent, however, involve complex and evolving
issues of international law.52
The travaux preparatoires report debate on the question
of the scope and level of intent required to commit genocide.53
The adoption of the words "as such" after the enumeration of
protected groups represented a compromise designed to satisfy
both the delegates who favored inclusion of a motive and those
who thought it counterproductive. 54 Given this context, the "as
such" language is susceptible of both a general and a stricter,
motive-based, interpretation. As the delegate from Siam noted,
"there were two possible interpretations of the words 'as such';
they might mean 'in that the group is a national, racial, religious,
or political group', or 'because the group is a national, racial,
religious or political group.'"55
The judges of the ICTR and ICTY have, on several
occasions, been called upon to consider genocidal intent.56 The
decisions thus far have held that a genocide conviction requires
a showing of a particular intent. The judgments have referred
to this intent variously as specific intent, genocidal intent,
or dolus specialis.57 These terms have somewhat divergent meaning
in domestic jurisprudence and these decisions have not always been
internally consistent in their discussions of intent. Moreover, the
decisions have essentially been silent on whether a perpetrator must
consciously desire destruction of the group, or whether knowledge
that such destruction may ensue in the course of his actions will be
sufficient.58 We note further that the discussion of the appropriate
legal standard for intent is inherently fact-specific and, in light
of the factual disputes on this point, we do not express an opinion on
the standard that might be applied in any particular determination of
whether the Events constituted genocide as defined in the Convention.
D. Conclusion
The crucial issue of genocidal intent is contested,
and this legal memorandum is not intended to definitively resolve
particular factual disputes. Nonetheless, we believe that the most
reasonable conclusion to draw from the various accounts referred to
above of the Events is that, notwithstanding the efforts of large
numbers of "righteous Turks"59 who intervened on behalf of the
Armenians, at least some of the perpetrators of the Events knew
that the consequence of their actions would be the destruction,
in whole or in part, of the Armenians of eastern Anatolia, as such,
or acted purposively towards this goal, and, therefore, possessed
the requisite genocidal intent. Because the other three elements
identified above have been definitively established, the Events,
viewed collectively, can thus be said to include all of the elements
of the crime of genocide as defined in the Convention, and legal
scholars as well as historians, politicians, journalists and other
people would be justified in continuing to so describe them.
*****
FOOTNOTES:
1 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, U.N.G.A. Res. 260,
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 179th Plen. Mtg. at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) [hereinafter "Genocide Convention" or the "Convention"].
2 We acknowledge disagreement as to the magnitude and scope
of these events, their context and intended effect, and the
identities and affiliations of their perpetrators. See, e.g.,
on the one hand, Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ten Questions, Ten
Answers: Did 1.5 Million Armenians Die During World War I?,
available at http://www.turkey.org/governmentpolitics/
documents/10Q10A.pdf/; and, on the other hand,
Armenian National Institute, Genocide FAQ, available at
http://www.armenian-genocide.org/genocidefaq.htm#HowMany. This
memorandum adopts the terminology of TARC reflected in the MoU in
referring to these events hereinafter as the "Events."
3 Genocide Convention, Art. I.
4 Id., Art. II.
5 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed
in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for
Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighboring States, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d Mtg. at 3.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, Annex (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1602
(1994) [hereinafter "ICTR Statute"]; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704,
Annex, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1994) [hereinafter "ICTY
Statute"]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9
(1958), available at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm [hereinafter
"ICC Statute"].
6 Genocide Convention, Art. III. The Convention refers in several
instances to "genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article
III" (or words to that effect). See id., Arts. IV, V, VI, VII, VIII
and IX. For purposes of convenience, references in this memorandum
to the international crime of "genocide" are intended, unless the
context clearly indicates otherwise, to encompass genocide and the
other acts enumerated in article III of the Genocide Convention.
7 Id., Art. IV. While Article IV provides only that "persons"
(rather than states) shall be punished for committing genocide,
Article IX of the Convention provides that disputes between states
party to the Genocide Convention relating to its interpretation,
application or fulfillment, "including those relating to the
responsibility of a State for genocide," shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") at the request of any of the
parties to the dispute. Id., Art. IX. The ICJ has stated that the
reference in Article IV of the Convention to "rulers" or "public
officials" "does not exclude any form of State responsibility …
for acts of its organs" and that Article IX's reference to State
responsibility may include responsibility for the commission of
genocide, as well as responsibility for failure to fulfill the
State's obligations to prevent and punish genocide as set forth in
Articles V, VI and VII. See Int'l Ct. of Justice, Case Concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary
Objections (July 11, 1996), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyjudgment/ibhy_ijudgment_19960711_frame.htm,
¶ 32.
8 Genocide Convention, Arts. V-VII.
9 Id., Art. VIII.
10 Id., Art. IX.
11 Id., Arts. X-XIX
12 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), Art. 28 [hereinafter "Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties"].
13 International Law Commission, Reports of the Commission to
the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 169, 177,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1.
14 Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States relating
to International Law, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 142, 147 (1981)(quoting
text of a letter dated Sept. 12, 1980 from Roberts B. Owen, Legal
Adviser of the U.S. Dep't of State, to Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation).
15 "This principle, and the conditions and exceptions to which it is
subject, have been embodied in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which may in many respects be considered
as a codification of existing customary law on the subject of
the termination of a treaty relationship on account of change
of circumstances." Int'l Ct. of Justice, Fisheries Jurisdiction
(U.K. v. Ice.), Jurisdiction of the Court, 1973 I.C.J. 3, 8
(Feb. 2).
16 "The rules laid down by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
concerning termination of a treaty relationship on account of
breach (adopted without a dissenting vote) may in many respects
be considered as a codification of existing customary law on the
subject." Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970 I.C.J. 6, (Jun. 21).
17 See generally Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law III,
Introductory Note (1987).
18 Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), Preliminary Objections, 1952
I.C.J. 27, 40 (July 1).
19 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, 1924 PCIJ (Ser. A.) No. 2
("An essential characteristic therefore of Protocol XII [is]
that its effects extend to legal situations dating from a time
previous to its own existence. If provision were not made in the
clauses or the Protocol for the protection of the rights recognized
therein as against infringements before the coming into force
of that instrument, the Protocol would be ineffective as regards
the very period at which the rights in question are most in need
of protection.").
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 28.
21 Ambatielos Case, supra note 18. See also Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law § 322 (1987).
22 Genocide Convention, Art. 1.
23 Id., Art. 5.
24 Id., Art. 6.
25 Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part
I, Sixth Committee, p. 13 (Statement of Mr. Morozov) [hereinafter
"Travaux Preparatoires"]. See also id. pp. 41- 42 (statement of
Mr. Dihigo), p.44 (statement of Mr. Kaeckenbeeck).
26 Travaux Preparatoires, p. 30 (statement of Mr. Prochazka). See
also id. p. 15 (Statement of Mr. Sundaram) ("genocide should be made
a punishable crime"), p. 78 (Statement of Mr. Maûrtua)("the concept
of genocide was new"), p. 126 (Statement of Mr. Messina)(genocide
was "a new crime under international law"), p. 127 (Statement of
Mr. Fitzmaurice)("the aim of the convention was to establish the
concept of a new crime").
27 Int'l Ct. of Justice, Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion
(May 28, 1951), 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23. The ICJ recently confirmed that
"the rights and obligations enshrined by the [Genocide] Convention
are rights and obligations erga omnes." Int'l Ct. of Justice,
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections (July 11, 1996), 1996
I.C.J. 595, 616.
28 On May 24, 1915 the Allies issued a joint declaration that "[i]n
view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and
civilization, the Allied governments announce publicly ... that they
will hold personally responsible ... all members of the Ottoman
government and those of their agents who are implicated in such
massacres [of Armenians]." See Matthew Lippman, The Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty
Years Later, 15 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 415, 416 (1998). The 1919
Report of the Commission on Responsibility of the Authors of the
War and on Enforcement of Penalties concluded that the Ottoman
Empire's treatment of Armenians in its territory contravened
"the established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws
of humanity," and declared that Ottoman officials accused of such
acts were liable for prosecution. Commission on the Responsibility
of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties,
Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29,
1919, reprinted in 14 Am. J. Int'l L. 95, 112-17 (1920). The
two U.S. delegates dissented, objecting most strenuously to the
criminalization of contraventions of the laws of humanity. The
laws of humanity were, they believed, a moral rather than a legal
concept, and they felt that the prosecution of individuals before a
newly created international court for violation of the ill-defined
laws of humanity would constitute retroactive prosecution. Id.,
at 134-36.
29 Lemkin uses the term to refer, among other things, to "classical
examples of wars of extermination in which nations and groups of the
population were completely or almost completely destroyed." Examples
cited include the destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C.; the
destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in 72 A.D.; the religious wars
of Islam and the Crusades; the massacres of the Albigenses and
the Wladenses; and the siege of Magdeburg in the Thirty Years'
War. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe 80 at n. 3 (1944).
30 Genocide Convention, preamble.
31 Travaux Preparatoires, p. 23 (Statement of Mr. Blanco).
32 Id., p. 500. (Statement of Mr. Raafat).
33 Id., p. 40 (Statement of Sir Hartley Shawcross).
34 Id., p. 28 (Statement of Mr. Bustos Fierro).
35 G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1 (1946)
(emphasis added).
36 See Travaux Preparatoires, at p. 9 (Statement of Mr. Bartos), 19
(Statement of Mr. Lachs), id., p. 30 (Statement of Mr. Prochazka)
(referring to the relationship between genocide and the doctrines of
Nazism, fascism and Japanese imperialism); id., p. 501 (Statement
of Mr. Chaumont ("the convention would never have been drafted
if it had not been for the crimes committed under the Nazi and
fascist regimes").
37 See Travaux Preparatoires, p. 17 (Statement of Mr. Manini y
Ríos)("it was generally known that the nazi and fascist parties
went to extremes of genocidal crime, but ... there was no need
to include [an explicit] qualification [to that effect] in the
convention"), p. 24 (Statement of Mr. Tsien Tai), pp. 489-509,
passim. It is clear that Lemkin's awareness of and research into
the Events also had an important role in animating his advocacy
for the adoption of the Convention. See Samantha Power, "A Problem
from Hell:" America and the Age of Genocide 17-20 (2002).
38 Supra note 2.
39 Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, Report of the
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
Addendum, Part II, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000), at 6
[hereinafter "Elements of Crimes"]. The analysis set forth herein
is limited to the crime of "genocide by killing." In analyzing
whether the Events constituted genocide by other means (e.g.,
"genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm" or "genocide
by deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring
about physical destruction"), one or more additional elements
might have to be proved. Id., at 6-8.
40 Id., at 6.
41 For example, The New York Times printed numerous articles relating
to the Events, which are collected and reprinted in Richard
D. Kloian, The Armenian Genocide: News Accounts from the American
Press, 1915-1922 (3d ed. 2000).
42 See, e.g., Armenian Rebellions and Massacres: Veteran and
Eyewitness Accounts in Armenian Issue: Allegations-Facts, available
at http://www.kultur.gov.tr/portal/tarih_en.asp?belgeno=159.
43 See, e.g., Armin T. Wegner, Armin T. Wegner and the Armenians in
Anatolia, 1915: Images and Testimonies (1996); Stanley Kerr, Lions
of Marash: Personal Experiences with American Near East Relief
(1973); Henry H. Riggs, Days of Tragedy in Armenia: Personal
Experiences in Harpoot, 1915-1917 (1997); Leslie A. Davis, The
Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat's Report on the
Armenian Genocide of 1915-1917 (1988), Viscount James Bryce and
Arnold J. Toynbee (eds.), The Treatment of the Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire, 1915- 1916 (2d ed. 1972). Often cited as well
are the accounts of Henry Morgenthau, the American ambassador to
Turkey from 1913 to 1916, who was reported to have frequently and
persitently intervened on behalf of the Armenians with Turkish
officials and was instrumental in bringing international attention
to the Events. See, e.g., Morgenthau Intercedes, N.Y. Times,
April 29, 1915, reprinted in Kloian, supra note 41, at 10; Laud
Our Ambassador, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1915, reprinted in Kloian,
supra note 41, at 29. Morgenthau included his account of what he
termed "the murder of a nation" in his memoirs, published in 1918.
Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (1918), at 301
et seq.
44 See, e.g., Abraham Hartunian, Neither to Laugh nor to Weep:
A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide (2d ed. 1986); John Minassian,
Many Hills Yet to Climb: Memoirs of an Armenian Deportee (1986);
Donald E. Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller, Survivors: An Oral
History of the Armenian Genocide (1993).
45 See, e.g., Vahakn Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and
International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and its
Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 Yale. J. Int'l L. 221,
291-315 (1989).
46 For example, documents in the U.S. archives are available in
the National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group
59, Decimal Files 867 and 860J. U.K. archives are available in
the Public Record Office, Foreign Office Records, Class 371. The
Republic of Turkey indicates that the Turkish archives, maintained
at the Prime Minstry's State Archives, are open and available
to all. See Important Questions And Answers: Is There Access
to the Ottoman Archives? Are Documents Related [to] Relocation
Concealed? in Armenian Issue: Allegations-Facts, available at
http://www.kultur.gov.tr/portal/tarih_en.asp?belgeno=253.
47 Supra note 43.
48 See e.g, Morgenthau, supra note 43; Descendants of Survivors of
the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust, 126 Holocaust Scholars
Affirm the Incontestable Fact of the Armenian Genocide and Urge
Western Democracies to Officially Recognize It, N.Y. Times,
June 9, 2000, at A29 (reproducing a statement "affirming that
the World War I Armenian Genocide is an incontestable historical
fact"). We note that many Turkish accounts dispute the objectivity
and authenticity of these accounts and, in particular, insist
that the deportations consisted of preventive measures to
relocate certain Armenians who posed a threat, and that most
of the killings were the result of inevitable casualties of the
war and of banditry (in other words, the Events were animated by
political and security-related motives or with ordinary criminal
intent, and not with genocidal intent). See, e.g., Ysmet Bynark,
Foreword, in Selected Books: Armenians in Ottoman Turkey (Oct. 30,
1995), available at http:www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eg/eg11/02.htm;
Relocation: Attacks on Armenian Convoys and Measures Taken by
the Government, in Armenian Issue: Allegations-Facts, available
at http://www.ermenisorunu.gen.tr/english/relocation/measures.html.
49 See Armenian Allegations of Genocide: The Issue and the Facts, at
http://www.turkishembassy.org/governmentpolitics/issuesarmenian.htm/.
50 Genocide Convention, Art. IV.
51 ICTR Statute, supra note 5, Art. 3; ICTY Statute, supra note 5, Art. 4.
52 See Payam Akhavan, Contributions of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to Developments of
Definitions of Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide, 94 Am. Soc'y
Int'l L. Proc. 279, 282 (2000); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt,
Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based
Interpretation, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2259, 2278 (1999).
53 Travaux Preparatoires, pp. 117-139. The term dolus specialis was
used to connote this particular intent. It was repeatedly argued
that what distinguished genocide from murder was the particular
intent to destroy a group; as the Brazilian delegate pointed out,
"genocide [is] characterized by the factor of particular intent
to destroy a group. In the absence of that factor, whatever the
degree of atrocity of an act and however similar it might be to
the acts described in the convention, that act could still not be
called genocide." Id., pp. 81-89.
54 Travaux Preparatoires, pp. 129-139. See also Greenawalt, supra
note 52, at 2278.
55 Travaux Preparatoires, p. 133. The protected groups identified by
the Siamese delegate later changed.
56 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber 1, Sept. 2,
1998), available at http://www.ictr.org/; Prosecutor v. Clément
Kayishema & Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 1999
WL 33288417 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber II, May 21,
1999); Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-IA-T,
Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber 1, June 7, 2001),
available at http://www.ictr.org; Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic,
Case No. ICTY-95-10-A, Appeals Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, July 5, 2001), available at
www.un.org/icty/brcko/appeal/judgment/index.htm; Prosecutor v.
Sikirica, Case No. ICTY-95-8-T, Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber III, September 3, 2001), available at
www.un.org/icty/sikirica/judgment/indexe.htm; Prosecutor v. Krstic,
Case No. ICTY-98-33, Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber 1, Aug. 2, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialC1/judgment/index.htm.
57 In a 300-page judgment issued on September 2, 1998, the Trial
Chamber of the ICTR found a former Rwandan mayor, Jean Paul Akayesu,
guilty of various charges of genocide and crimes against humanity,
the first genocide conviction since Nuremberg. Regarding the germane
issue of criminal intent, the Trial Chamber said "[g]enocide is
distinct from other crimes inasmuch as it embodies a special intent
or dolus specialis. Special intent of a crime is the specific
intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which
demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act
charged. Thus, the special intent in the crime of genocide lies in
'the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such." Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul
Akayesu, supra note 56, ¶ 498.
58 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, supra note 56, ¶ 571.
59 Paul Glastris, Armenia's History, Turkey's Dilemma,
Wash. Post, March 11, 2001, at B01; Zoryan Institute, Turks
Who Saved Armenians: An Introduction (rev. ed.), available at
http://www.zoryaninstitute.org/Table_Of_Contents/genocide_docs_turksintro.htm.
Armenian-Turkish Film-Fest Dialogue
ArmenPress
Nov 23 2001
TURKS, ARMENIANS TRYING TO OVERCOME PAST
ISTANBUL, NOVEMBER 23, ARMENPRESS: Scientists and art critics
from Armenia, Turkey, Switzerland and France gathered in Istanbul, on
the sidelines of an international film festival, to share their
viewpoints and visions about how Armenia and Turkey should overcome
their bitter past and move ahead. The meeting is called "Turks and
Armenians: One Thousand Years Together."
A Turkish on-line "ntvmsnbc" newspaper writes that experts on
Turkish and Armenian affairs from the four countries stressed that
the history should not be politicized and that it should be
approached from the positions of science.
The French historian Jefakoff said that no matter how hard it is
neighbor countries should do everything to normalize relations.
An Armenian expert on Turkish affairs Alexander Safarian said
that though Turkey has recognized Armenia's independence, but refuses
to establish diplomatic relations with it. Safarian went on to say
that not only the two nations, but the governments as well should
embark on a constructive dialogue. He also emphasized the necessity
for development of Turkish-Armenian relations within the framework of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), adding that Armenian
representation in the BSEC, located in Istanbul, has good chances to
contribute to it.
Safarian meantime described the role of Azerbaijan in
Turkish-Armenian relations as "difficult to comprehend." Citing the
example of Cyprus, he said that despite it Turkey and Greece continue
maintaining diplomatic relations.
Nov 23 2001
TURKS, ARMENIANS TRYING TO OVERCOME PAST
ISTANBUL, NOVEMBER 23, ARMENPRESS: Scientists and art critics
from Armenia, Turkey, Switzerland and France gathered in Istanbul, on
the sidelines of an international film festival, to share their
viewpoints and visions about how Armenia and Turkey should overcome
their bitter past and move ahead. The meeting is called "Turks and
Armenians: One Thousand Years Together."
A Turkish on-line "ntvmsnbc" newspaper writes that experts on
Turkish and Armenian affairs from the four countries stressed that
the history should not be politicized and that it should be
approached from the positions of science.
The French historian Jefakoff said that no matter how hard it is
neighbor countries should do everything to normalize relations.
An Armenian expert on Turkish affairs Alexander Safarian said
that though Turkey has recognized Armenia's independence, but refuses
to establish diplomatic relations with it. Safarian went on to say
that not only the two nations, but the governments as well should
embark on a constructive dialogue. He also emphasized the necessity
for development of Turkish-Armenian relations within the framework of
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), adding that Armenian
representation in the BSEC, located in Istanbul, has good chances to
contribute to it.
Safarian meantime described the role of Azerbaijan in
Turkish-Armenian relations as "difficult to comprehend." Citing the
example of Cyprus, he said that despite it Turkey and Greece continue
maintaining diplomatic relations.
ARF on TARC's End
Text of Dashnak statement on Armenian-Turkish dialogue
Yerkir
13 Dec 01
YEREVAN
Text of statement by the bureau of the ARFD [Armenian Revolutionary
Federation - Dashnaktsutyun published by Armenian newspaper Yerkir on 13
December
The statement by members of the Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission,
published on 11 December, is about stopping the work of the commission. This
is belated recognition of the failure of the goals proclaimed by the Armenian
members of the commission.
The Armenian members of the commission and their sponsor, the Armenian
Assembly of America, should have foreseen from the very start that this
commission would be used to undermine the question of Turkey recognizing the
Armenian Genocide and to hinder the momentum of its international recognition
and Armenia's demands. During the five months of the commission's existence
and as a direct result of its activity great damage has been done on the
political scenes of the USA and Europe and recognition of the Armenian
Genocide has encountered great obstacles. All those who participated in and
supported this commission in its experimental and adventurous endeavour are
accountable to history. The negative results of their activity will
undoubtedly continue to be felt for some time to come.
In connection with this, we state:
a) There can be no reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey without
acceptance of this historical reality. Any Armenian-Turkish dialogue can only
be effective after Turkey recognizes the Armenian Genocide.
b) While accepting the necessity for a healthy dialogue between two sovereign
states, the problem of Turkey's responsibility for the Armenian Genocide
cannot be separated from the sphere of Armenian-Turkish relations. So the
problem of recognition of the Armenian Genocide is an integral part of
Armenian foreign policy.
c) Now more than ever, the efforts to achieve international recognition of
the Armenian Genocide will proceed with new and unprecedented vigour and it
is expected of international political circles and public opinion to assist
in these efforts, especially in view of the determination of the Armenian
people to reestablish and secure truth and justice.
Yerkir
13 Dec 01
YEREVAN
Text of statement by the bureau of the ARFD [Armenian Revolutionary
Federation - Dashnaktsutyun published by Armenian newspaper Yerkir on 13
December
The statement by members of the Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission,
published on 11 December, is about stopping the work of the commission. This
is belated recognition of the failure of the goals proclaimed by the Armenian
members of the commission.
The Armenian members of the commission and their sponsor, the Armenian
Assembly of America, should have foreseen from the very start that this
commission would be used to undermine the question of Turkey recognizing the
Armenian Genocide and to hinder the momentum of its international recognition
and Armenia's demands. During the five months of the commission's existence
and as a direct result of its activity great damage has been done on the
political scenes of the USA and Europe and recognition of the Armenian
Genocide has encountered great obstacles. All those who participated in and
supported this commission in its experimental and adventurous endeavour are
accountable to history. The negative results of their activity will
undoubtedly continue to be felt for some time to come.
In connection with this, we state:
a) There can be no reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey without
acceptance of this historical reality. Any Armenian-Turkish dialogue can only
be effective after Turkey recognizes the Armenian Genocide.
b) While accepting the necessity for a healthy dialogue between two sovereign
states, the problem of Turkey's responsibility for the Armenian Genocide
cannot be separated from the sphere of Armenian-Turkish relations. So the
problem of recognition of the Armenian Genocide is an integral part of
Armenian foreign policy.
c) Now more than ever, the efforts to achieve international recognition of
the Armenian Genocide will proceed with new and unprecedented vigour and it
is expected of international political circles and public opinion to assist
in these efforts, especially in view of the determination of the Armenian
people to reestablish and secure truth and justice.
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